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COGNITIVELY IMPAIRED HUMANS, INTELLIGENT ANIMALS, 
AND LEGAL PERSONHOOD
Richard L. Cupp*
Abstract
This Article analyzes whether courts should grant legal personhood to 
intelligent animal species, such as chimpanzees, with a particular focus 
on comparisons made to cognitively impaired humans whom the law
recognizes as legal persons even though they may have less practical 
autonomy than intelligent animals. Granting legal personhood would 
allow human representatives to initiate some legal actions with the 
animals as direct parties to the litigation, as the law presently allows for 
humans with cognitive impairments that leave them incapable of 
representing their own interests. For example, a human asserting to act 
on behalf of an intelligent animal might seek a writ of habeas corpus to 
demand release from a restrictive environment where less restrictive 
environments, such as relatively spacious sanctuaries, are available. 
Highly publicized litigation seeking legal personhood in a habeas corpus 
context for chimpanzees is underway in New York, and the lawsuits have 
garnered the support of some eminent legal scholars and philosophers. 
Regardless of its short-term success or failure, this litigation represents 
the beginning of a long struggle with broad and deep societal 
implications. 
A unanimous New York appellate court quoted and largely followed 
a previous article by the author in People ex rel. Nonhuman Rights 
Project, Inc. v. Lavery (Lavery I), a prominent and controversial 2014 
appellate decision addressing (and rejecting) legal personhood for 
                                                                                                                     
* John W. Wade Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law. I thank 
Pepperdine University School of Law for providing a research grant in support of this Article. I 
also thank Jodi Kruger, Natalie Lagunas, and Samantha Parrish for providing consistently 
outstanding research assistance; Naomi Goodno, David Han, Barry McDonald, and Robert 
Pushaw for providing feedback on a draft of portions of this Article; and Justin Beck and Mark 
Scarberry for their thoughts and input regarding animal legal personhood. The input and 
assistance these individuals have graciously provided me do not necessarily indicate that they
agree with any or all of this Article’s theses. Excerpts and footnotes from Sections III.A and III.B 
of this Article have been published alongside a paper by Professor Lawrence Tribe, which 
supports consideration of the chimpanzee personhood lawsuits, in Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Focusing 
on Human Responsibility Rather Than Legal Personhood for Nonhuman Animals, 33 PACE
ENVTL. L. REV. 517 (2016), and similar excerpts from this Article have also been published in 
Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Human Responsibility, Not Legal Personhood, for Nonhuman Animals,
ENGAGE, July 2015, at 34. The excerpted segments of this Article noted above draw heavily from 
the author’s February 2015 comments at the National Press Club in Animal Personhood: A 
Debate, FEDERALIST SOC’Y (Feb. 19, 2015), http://www.fed-soc.org/multimedia/detail/animal-
personhood-a-debate-event-audiovideo. This Article is dedicated to Rachel Firemark, whose 
work with both adults and children who live with cognitive impairments and who experience 
mental health and emotional challenges continually impresses and inspires me. 
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chimpanzees. In June 2017, another unanimous New York appellate court 
agreed with the Lavery I decision in In re Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. 
v. Lavery (Lavery II), and the court addressed an amicus curiae brief by 
the author in explaining its decision. This Article builds on the author’s
previous article followed in Lavery I and supported by the reasoning of 
Lavery II. The previous article focused on justice arguments based on 
young children with limited practical autonomy being granted legal 
personhood status. The New York lawsuits and other significant 
developments have highlighted important additional issues and nuances 
since the previous article’s publication. Further, in the previous article,
the author indicated that additional scholarship was necessary to address 
justice arguments based on the recognition of legal personhood for 
humans with cognitive impairments not related to typical childhood 
development, such as humans with significant intellectual disabilities or 
comatose humans. This Article analyzes these comparisons based on 
cognitive impairments not related to childhood and examines issues 
presented by the New York lawsuits. The Article concludes that, like 
comparisons between intelligent animals and young children, 
comparisons between intelligent animals and humans with cognitive 
impairments unrelated to childhood do not support restructuring our legal 
system to make animals persons. Further, the rights of the most 
vulnerable humans, particularly humans with severe cognitive 
impairments, would be endangered over the long term if the law were to 
grant legal personhood to some animals based on cognitive abilities. 
Thus, courts should continue to reject animal legal personhood in the 
lawsuits that will likely continue to be filed in numerous jurisdictions for 
decades. However, legislatures and courts should embrace societal 
evolution calling for greater human responsibility regarding treatment of
animals.
INTRODUCTION .....................................................................................467 
I. ANIMAL LEGAL PERSONHOOD LAWSUITS ..............................473 
A. People ex rel. Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v.
Lavery (Lavery I)............................................................475 
B. In re Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Presti................479 
C. The Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Stanley ..............480 
D. Matter of Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. 
Lavery (Lavery II) ..........................................................482
II. FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL PERSONHOOD FOR COGNITIVELY
IMPAIRED HUMANS ................................................................487
2
Florida Law Review, Vol. 69, Iss. 2 [2017], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol69/iss2/3
2017] COGNITIVELY IMPAIRED HUMANS, INTELLIGENT ANIMALS, AND LEGAL PERSONHOOD 467
III. LEGAL PERSONHOOD FOR HUMANS WITH COGNITIVE 
IMPAIRMENTS DOES NOT SUPPORT LEGAL
PERSONHOOD FOR INTELLIGENT ANIMALS .............................499 
A. Legal Personhood for Intelligent Animals Would
Pose Threats to Humans with Serious Cognitive 
Impairments ....................................................................500
B. Among Beings of Which We Are Aware, Appropriate
Legal Personhood Is Anchored Only in the Human
Community......................................................................503 
C. The Broad Range of Circumstances Related to
Human Cognitive Impairments Further
Undercuts Efforts to Make Autonomy
Comparisons with Animals.............................................509 
IV. CONCLUSION: FINDING A MIDDLE GROUND FOR EVOLVING
ANIMAL PROTECTION IN A CHANGING SOCIETY.....................513 
A. How Far Might Animal Personhood and
Rights Extend?................................................................513 
B. Applauding an Evolving Focus on Human
Responsibility for Animal Welfare Rather
than the Radical Approach of Animal
Legal Personhood...........................................................515 
INTRODUCTION
The New York Times did not create the controversy over whether 
courts should determine that an intelligent nonhuman animal, such as a 
chimpanzee, is a legal person entitled to some level of bodily liberty.1
However, the Times’s series of articles and op-eds highlighting the 
lawsuits likely helped generate the more widespread media firestorm of 
coverage regarding the lawsuits and demonstrated that the issues 
involved are on the cutting edge of legal rights jurisprudence.
When the Nonhuman Rights Project (NhRP) filed three related 
lawsuits in New York courts in late 2013 arguing that chimpanzees 
should be considered legal persons and moved to sanctuaries that would 
allow them more bodily liberty, the Times published a substantial article 
setting forth the major issues.2 The next week, the Times published an in-
depth news analysis article on the cases, entitled Considering the 
                                                                                                                     
1. For the sake of brevity, this Article will refer to New York Times as “the Times,” and to
“nonhuman animals” as “animals.”
2. See James Gorman, Rights Group Is Seeking Status of ‘Legal Person’ for Captive 
Chimpanzee, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2013, at A19.
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Humanity of Nonhumans.3
A few months later, the New York Times Magazine made the 
chimpanzee lawsuits its cover story with another in-depth article.4 At the 
same time, it placed on its website an “Op-Doc,” a short, opinionated 
documentary made by prominent filmmakers D. A. Pennebaker and Chris 
Hegedus, entitled Animals Are Persons Too.5 The Times also published 
Behind the Cover Story: Charles Siebert on the Fight for Animal 
“Personhood” featuring questions and answers with the author of The
New York Times Magazine cover story.6 Other stories from the Times 
followed as the cases progressed through lower courts and appellate 
courts from 2014 to the present.7
The Times was hardly alone in providing a great deal of analysis and 
discussion regarding the cases. A large number of national and 
international news sources extensively reported on the cases. For a few 
of many available examples, Time Magazine reported on primatologist 
Jane Goodall’s support for the lawsuits (she is a member of the NhRP
Board of Directors);8 Peter Singer, perhaps the best-known living 
academic philosopher, published at least two op-ed articles supporting 
the lawsuits;9 the Wall Street Journal produced a short video explaining 
the lawsuits;10 and the BBC World Service hosted a lengthy debate 
                                                                                                                     
3. James Gorman, Considering the Humanity of Nonhumans, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2013,
at D1.
4. See Charles Siebert, Should a Chimp Be Able to Sue Its Owner?, N.Y. TIMES MAG., 
Apr. 23, 2014, at MM28.
5. Chris Hegedus & D.A. Pennebaker, ‘Animals Are Persons Too,’ N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/23/opinion/animals-are-persons-too.html. 
6. Rachel Nolan, Behind the Cover Story: Charles Siebert on the Fight for Animal 
‘Personhood,’ N.Y. TIMES: 6TH FLOOR (Apr. 28, 2014, 5:30 AM), http://6thfloor.blogs.nytimes.
com/2014/04/28/behind-the-cover-story-charles-siebert-on-the-fight-for-animal-personhood/. 
7. See, e.g., James C. McKinley Jr., Arguing in Court Whether 2 Chimps Have the Right 
to ‘Bodily Liberty,’ N.Y. TIMES (May 27, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/28/nyregion/
arguing-in-court-whether-2-chimps-have-the-right-to-bodily-liberty.html; Jesse McKinley, 
Chimps Don’t Have Same Rights as Humans, Court Says, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/05/nyregion/chimps-dont-have-same-rights-as-humans-
court-says.html.
8. See About Us, NONHUMAN RTS. PROJECT, http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/
about-us-2/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2017); Bryan Walsh, Do Chimps Have Human Rights?, TIME
(Dec. 2, 2013), http://science.time.com/2013/12/02/chimps-human-rights-lawsuit/.
9. See Peter Singer, Chimpanzees Are People, Too, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Oct. 21, 2014, 6:35 
PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/peter-singer-chimpanzees-people-article-1.1982262; 
Peter Singer, There Is No Good Reason to Keep Apes in Prison, WIRED (May 26, 2015, 12:53 
PM), http://www.wired.com/2015/05/peter-singer-no-good-reason-keep-apes-prison/. 
10. See Are Chimps People Too? A Potential Legal Evolution, WALL ST. J.: VIDEO (Oct. 9, 
2014, 6:55 PM), http://www.wsj.com/video/are-chimps-people-too-a-potential-legal-evolution/
B9EDDFA0-90EA-4B25-81F1-B84ECD90A17B.html. 
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inspired by the lawsuits.11
In July 2014, NhRP president and lead attorney Steven Wise appeared 
as a guest on The Colbert Report to discuss the lawsuits.12 In March 2015, 
the nonprofit Technology, Entertainment, and Design (TED) invited Mr.
Wise to give a TED Talk addressing chimpanzee legal personhood at the 
TED2015 conference in Vancouver, Canada, and TED selected his talk 
for release on Ted.com.13 As of February 2017, the TED Talk had been 
viewed more than one million times.14 In January 2016, a documentary 
about the lawsuits made by the Oscar-winning documentary filmmaker 
D. A. Pennebaker and Chris Hegedus (who also made the short Op-Doc 
featured on the Times’s website), premiered at the Sundance Film 
Festival.15 The documentary aired on HBO, BBC Television, and other 
television outlets beginning later in 2016.16
Thus, the question of whether the law should consider particularly 
intelligent species of animals to be legal persons has developed roots as 
a matter of serious public debate. Further, the debate will likely span 
decades in courts, legislatures, and the public square.17 In September 
2015, Mr. Wise stated that “[w]e are still in the early stages of a long-
term multi-state strategic litigation campaign to change the legal status of 
appropriate nonhuman animals.”18 The door to legitimacy as an issue has 
                                                                                                                     
11. See Nim the Chimp and Animal Rights, BBC WORLD SERV. (May 21, 2015),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p02rf5pj.
12. The Colbert Report, COMEDY CENT. (July 17, 2014), http://www.cc.com/video-
clips/70ezhu/the-colbert-report-steven-m--wise. 
13. See Press Release, NonHuman Rights Project, NonHuman Rights Project President 
Steven M. Wise Advocates for Nonhuman Rights in New TED Talk (May 20, 2015), 
http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/2015/05/20/nonhuman-rights-project-president-steven-m
-wise-advocates-for-nonhuman-rights-in-new-ted-talk/.
14. See Chimps Have Feelings and Thoughts. They Should Also Have Rights, TED
(Mar. 2015), http://www.ted.com/talks/steven_wise_chimps_have_feelings_and_thoughts_they_
should_also_have_rights.
15. See Peter Debruge, Film Review: Unlocking the Cage, VARIETY (Feb. 8, 2016),
http://variety.com/2016/film/reviews/unlocking-the-cage-film-review-1201700001/ (reviewing 
the documentary and opining that it “essentially exposes the lawyer trying to trick a series of New 
York state judges into granting chimpanzees the same rights as humans,” and noting that the 
review was based on a viewing at the Sundance Film Festival).
16. Unlocking the Cage, PENNEBAKER HEGEDUS FILMS, unlockingthecagethefilm.com/
broadcast/ (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
17. See STEVEN M. WISE, RATTLING THE CAGE: TOWARD LEGAL RIGHTS FOR ANIMALS 72
(2000). NhRP President Steven Wise has asserted that “[i]n the face of attacks upon core beliefs, 
knowledge tends to advance, in the words of the economist Paul Samuelson, ‘funeral by funeral.’” 
Id.
18. Steven M. Wise, Statement re: NY Court of Appeals Decision to Deny Motion to Appeal 
in Tommy’s and Kiko’s Cases, NONHUMAN RTS. PROJECT (Sept. 1, 2015), 
http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/2015/09/01/statement-re-ny-court-of-appeals-decision-to
-deny-motion-for-leave-to-appeal-in-tommys-and-kikos-cases/.
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been opened, and it is not likely to be closed anytime soon, regardless of 
the fate of the initial New York cases.
A concept many philosophers refer to as the “argument from marginal 
cases” is a foundational pillar of equality arguments forwarded in support 
of rights or liberation for at least some animals.19 This argument 
compares the cognitive abilities and autonomy of intelligent animals, 
such as chimpanzees, with humans who have low cognitive abilities and 
autonomy but are nevertheless treated as persons with legal rights.20 For
example, human infants and very young children may have less cognitive 
ability and autonomy than a typical adult chimpanzee.21 Similarly, 
humans of all ages with severe cognitive impairments may have less 
cognitive ability and autonomy than a typical adult chimpanzee.22
Perhaps the most extreme illustration is a human born in a persistent
vegetative state.23 That person presumably has no cognitive ability or 
capacity for autonomy, and in some cases may not even be capable of 
experiencing pain, but is still considered a legal person entitled to legal 
rights.24 The argument from marginal cases asserts that if personhood and 
rights are granted to humans with very limited or no cognitive ability or 
autonomy, basic equality principles require that personhood and rights
must also be given to nonhuman animals who possess stronger cognitive 
ability and capacity for autonomy.25
A 2013 law review article by the author was quoted and largely 
followed by a unanimous court in the 2014 New York case People ex rel. 
Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Lavery (Lavery I),26 a prominent and 
controversial appellate court decision rejecting legal personhood for 
                                                                                                                     
19. See DANIEL A. DOMBROWSKI, BABIES AND BEASTS: THE ARGUMENT FROM MARGINAL 
CASES 1–2 (1997) (arguing against moral distinction of animals and humans). See generally PETER 
SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION (4th ed. 2009) (examining systematic disregard for animals and 
offering alternatives to current animal cruelty practices).
20. DOMBROWSKI, supra note 19, at 18–26; see TOM REGAN, THE CASE FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS 
151–55 (1st ed. 1983); PETER SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION 18 (2d ed. 1990); WISE, supra note 
17, at 243–48, 251–57, 270; STEVEN M. WISE, DRAWING THE LINE: SCIENCE AND THE CASE FOR 
ANIMAL RIGHTS 7, 32–33, 47, 157–58, 205–06, 235–38 (2002).
21. DOMBROWSKI, supra note 19, at 18. There is a wealth of evidence that chimpanzees are 
particularly intelligent animals. FRANS DE WAAL, CHIMPANZEE POLITICS: POWER AND SEX AMONG 
APES 3–41 (2007); see also Stefan Lovgren, Chimps, Humans 96 Percent the Same, Gene Study 
Finds, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Aug. 31, 2005), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2005/
08/0831_050831_chimp_genes.html (quoting primatologist Frans de Waal: “[w]e are apes in 
every way, from our long arms and tailless bodies to our habits and temperament”). 
22. See REGAN, supra note 20, at 151–55; SINGER, supra note 19, at 6–8. 
23. See DOMBROWSKI, supra note 19, at 26 (citing Tom Regan, The Moral Basis of 
Vegetarianism, 5 CANADIAN J. PHIL. 191, 193 (1975)).
24. See id.
25. See id. at 94–101.
26. 998 N.Y.S.2d 248 (App. Div. 2015).
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chimpanzees. In June 2017, another widely discussed and unanimous 
New York appellate decision, In re Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. 
Lavery (Lavery II)27 agreed with Lavery I in rejecting chimpanzee 
personhood lawsuits, and endorsed Lavery I’s reasoning.28 Lavery II 
addressed an amicus curiae brief filed by the author in explaining its 
decision. The author’s amicus curiae brief endorsed by the Lavery II court 
was inspired in part by the author’s 2013 law review article.
In the 2013 law review article, the author addressed the argument from 
marginal cases for animal legal personhood in the context of comparisons 
with young children.29 The author concluded that comparisons between 
young children and intelligent animals, such as chimpanzees, do not 
provide a viable basis for assigning legal personhood to intelligent 
animals.30 However, comparisons between intelligent animals and typical 
young children differ from comparisons between intelligent animals and 
other humans with severe cognitive impairments.31 In his previous article,
the author indicated that a separate scholarly article should address these 
different comparisons in more depth.32
This Article takes that next step, addressing background and 
comparisons between intelligent animals and humans with severe 
cognitive impairments that are distinct from comparisons based on 
typical childhood cognitive limitations for purposes of equality 
arguments purportedly supporting animal legal personhood. To avoid 
frequently repeating the wordy descriptions provided in the preceding 
sentence, this Article will refer to distinguishing equality comparisons 
made between “children” and intelligent animals, and equality 
comparisons made between “cognitively impaired humans” and 
intelligent animals. However, this simplification requires defining 
“children” and “cognitively impaired humans” for purposes of this 
Article. 
In this Article, “children” will generally refer only to typical infants 
and typical very young children. Although typically children will 
eventually develop much stronger cognitive abilities and much more 
autonomy than the most intelligent animals, at a very young age, they
                                                                                                                     
27. 54 N.Y.S.3d 392 (App. Div. 2017).
28. Id. at 393–95.
29. Richard L. Cupp Jr., Children, Chimps, and Rights: Arguments from “Marginal” 
Cases, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1 (2013) [hereinafter Cupp, Children and Chimps]. The Lavery I court 
noted that under the reciprocity view, society extends rights in exchange for members fulfilling 
social responsibilities. Lavery I, 998 N.Y.S.2d at 250 (first quoting Cupp, Children and Chimps,
supra, at 13; then citing Richard L. Cupp Jr., Moving Beyond Animal Rights: A 
Legal/Contractualist Critique, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 27, 69–70 (2009) [hereinafter Cupp, Moving 
Beyond Animal Rights]); see also discussion infra Section I.A.
30. Cupp, Children and Chimps, supra note 29, at 51–52. 
31. Id. at 49. 
32. Id. at 48–49. 
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undoubtedly have less autonomy than intelligent animals. The argument 
from marginal cases is not employed with typical older children, for 
example typical teenagers, because older children typically have stronger 
cognitive abilities and autonomy than intelligent animals.
This Article will use “cognitively impaired humans” to address all 
humans with cognitive impairments that are not a typical part of infancy 
or early childhood. This includes humans with temporary or permanent 
cognitive impairments, and it includes humans who have had these 
limitations from birth as well as humans who became cognitively 
impaired sometime later in their lives. Many people in this “cognitively 
impaired humans” description are adults, but in this Article, the term may 
include children with cognitive impairments that are not a typical part of 
infancy or early childhood. For example, both an infant born in a 
persistent vegetative state, and an adult who initially has typical cognitive 
abilities but who enters into a persistent vegetative state later in life 
because of an injury or medical condition, will be included in the 
“cognitively impaired humans” definition, because both of these 
individuals have cognitive impairments that are distinct from the 
cognitive impairments that are a typical aspect of infancy or early 
childhood. This Article also includes persons born with intellectual 
disabilities in its “cognitively impaired humans” definition. However, as 
shown in the illustration above, the term as used in this Article is broader 
than just persons born with intellectual disabilities.33
As addressed above, since the New York lawsuits were filed in late 
2013, public interest in the concept of animal legal personhood has risen 
dramatically.34 Also since late 2013, hundreds of pages of legal briefs 
have been filed by the parties to the lawsuits and by amici for New York 
lower courts, New York intermediate courts of appeal, and the State of 
New York Court of Appeals. Among other rulings, intermediate courts 
of appeal have issued three published opinions on the cases,35 and the 
State of New York Court of Appeals has ruled on a motion for leave to 
appeal two of the intermediate appellate court published decisions.36
                                                                                                                     
33. “Cognitively impaired humans,” as used in this Article, also includes persons with other 
cognitive limitations, such as autism spectrum disorder. See infra note 335 and accompanying 
text. This Article does not specifically address most mental illnesses, although mental illnesses 
may include cognitive limitations. See J.K. Trivedi, Cognitive Deficits in Psychiatric Disorders: 
Current Status, 48 INDIAN J. PSYCHIATRY 10, 10–20 (2006); Cognitive Impairment: A Major 
Problem for Individuals with Schizophrenia and Bipolar Disorder, MENTAL ILLNESS POL’Y ORG.,
http://mentalillnesspolicy.org/medical/cognitive-impairment.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2017).
34. See supra notes 1–18 and accompanying text.
35. Lavery II, 54 N.Y.S.3d 392 (App. Div. 2017); Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Presti, 
999 N.Y.S.2d 652 (App. Div. 2015); Lavery I, 998 N.Y.S.2d 248 (App. Div. 2014).
36. Lavery I, 998 N.Y.S.2d at 248, appeal denied, 17 N.Y.S.3d 82 (table); Nonhuman 
Rights Project, Inc. v. Presti, 999 N.Y.S.2d 652 (App. Div. 2015), appeal denied, 17 N.Y.S.3d 81 
(table).
8
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Thus, in addition to considering the equality argument that granting legal 
personhood to cognitively impaired humans requires granting legal 
personhood to animals with stronger cognitive ability and autonomy, this 
Article will also analyze a broader range of issues litigated in the New 
York cases.
In Part I, this Article will review the pre-2017 New York animal legal 
personhood cases and courts’ analyses of the cases, and will briefly 
reference the 2017 Lavery II decision. This Part will also critique some 
aspects of the cases not directly tied to comparisons between intelligent 
animals and humans with less cognitive ability. In Part II, this Article will 
elaborate on the argument from marginal cases and will demonstrate its 
centrality to equality arguments for intelligent-animal legal personhood.
Part II will establish the significance of cognitive ability and autonomy 
to the liberty arguments for intelligent-animal legal personhood. Part III 
will review the history of the rights movement for humans with cognitive 
impairments and will demonstrate that courts and advocates have 
repeatedly and consistently emphasized the humanity of persons with 
cognitive impairments as the basis for recognizing their rights as legal 
persons. Part IV will argue that recognizing rights and legal personhood 
for cognitively impaired humans does not require, nor even support, 
granting legal personhood to intelligent animals. Part IV will also 
elaborate on challenges to the argument from marginal cases that are 
relevant both to comparisons with cognitively impaired humans and to
comparisons with children. In concluding, this Article will emphasize 
that rejecting legal personhood for animals does not imply acceptance of 
the status quo regarding how we treat animals. Humans have weighty 
responsibilities regarding their treatment of animals, and society is 
appropriately evolving toward more thoughtful protections under an 
animal welfare paradigm.
I. ANIMAL LEGAL PERSONHOOD LAWSUITS
The first lawsuit in the United States that attracted significant attention 
in seeking a form of legal personhood for animals was Tilikum v. Sea 
World Parks & Entertainment, Inc.,37 filed in a U.S. District Court in San 
Diego in 2011.38 In Tilikum, an animal rights organization asserted 
protection from slavery and involuntary servitude for orcas at Sea 
World.39 It based its claims on the Thirteenth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution.40 In rejecting the lawsuit in 2012, the court held in a short 
                                                                                                                     
37. 842 F. Supp. 2d 1259 (S.D. Cal. 2012).
38. Id. at 1260.
39. Id.
40. Id.
9
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opinion that the Thirteenth Amendment “applies to persons, and does not 
apply to non-persons such as orcas.”41 Probably few observers were 
surprised that the lawsuit seeking animal personhood under the federal 
Constitution failed. Indeed, although the NhRP agreed that orcas are 
enslaved, it believed that the constitutional claim was “dangerously 
premature,” and that a negative decision on the merits would “damage 
future animal rights law cases.”42
Rather than seeking legal personhood under the federal Constitution 
at this time, the NhRP has focused on seeking legal personhood for 
intelligent animals in state courts under the common law writ of habeas 
corpus.43 After reviewing common law habeas corpus approaches and 
other matters for all fifty states,44 it chose to bring its first lawsuits in New 
York.45
The three lawsuits the NhRP filed in late 2013, Lavery I,46 Nonhuman
Rights Project v. Presti,47 and Nonhuman Rights Project v. Stanley,48 are 
nearly or entirely identical in terms of their major legal theories.49 They 
collectively involve four chimpanzees, two of which were kept by private 
individuals in New York,50 and two of which were kept until recently for 
research on the evolution of bipedalism at Stony Brook University.51
The NhRP’s attempt to apply the common law writ of habeas corpus 
on behalf of the chimpanzees was unusual, not only in that it brought the
                                                                                                                     
41. Id. at 1263.
42. Michael Mountain, Federal Judge Allows NhRP to Appear as Friend of the Court in 
PETA v. SeaWorld, NONHUMAN RTS. PROJECT (Jan. 26, 2012), http://www.nonhumanrights
project.org/2012/01/26/judge-welcomes-nhrp-amicus-memorandum-in-peta-v-seaworld/. The
NhRP filed an Amicus Curiae Memorandum “solely to assist the Court in understanding certain 
issues that were raised within the context of this litigation and to further the interests of the orcas.”
Id.
43. See Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Presti, 999 N.Y.S.2d 652, 653 (App. Div. 2015);
Lavery I, 998 N.Y.S.2d 248, 249 (App. Div. 2014). 
44. See Introduction to the 50 States, NONHUMAN RTS. PROJECT (May 16, 2013),
http://states.nonhumanrights.org/category/about/.
45. See cases cited infra notes 46–48.
46. 998 N.Y.S.2d 248 (App. Div. 2014). 
47. 999 N.Y.S.2d 652 (App. Div. 2015). 
48. 16 N.Y.S.3d 898 (Sup. Ct. 2015).
49. Because the lawsuits are so similar, this Article will sometimes cite to the NhRP’s initial 
brief for one as representative. Petitioner’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Order to Show 
Cause and Writ of Habeas Corpus and Order Granting the Immediate Release of Tommy, Lavery
I, 998 N.Y.S.2d 248 [hereinafter Lavery I Brief], http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/12/Memorandum-of-Law-Tommy-Case.pdf. 
50. See Presti, 999 N.Y.S.2d at 653–54; Lavery I, 998 N.Y.S.2d at 249. In February 2016,
the NhRP reported that Tommy, the chimpanzee in the Lavery lawsuits, had been moved to a 
“roadside zoo” in Michigan. Lauren Choplin, Update: Tommy, NONHUMAN RTS. PROJECT (Feb. 
16, 2016), http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/2016/02/12/update-tommy/.
51. See Stanley, 16 N.Y.S.3d at 900. 
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claims on behalf of nonhumans, but also in that most common law habeas 
corpus claims involve persons seeking release from government custody 
in jails or prisons.52 Although two of the lawsuits involved chimpanzees 
kept by private individuals rather than a government entity, the NhRP 
cited New York and other cases granting habeas corpus writs when a 
nongovernmental actor wrongfully imprisoned a person.53 Further, the 
NhRP emphasized that New York has allowed human slaves to use the 
common law writ of habeas corpus to obtain freedom from their owners.54
The lawsuits did not claim violation of any existing laws in the 
chimpanzees’ treatment.55 Rather, they argued that the chimpanzees are 
entitled to legal personhood under liberty and equality principles, 
asserting that each chimpanzee is “possessed of autonomy, self-
determination, self-awareness, and the ability to choose how to live his 
life, as well as dozens of complex cognitive abilities that comprise and 
support his autonomy.”56 The lawsuits also asserted that the chimpanzees
are entitled to legal personhood under a New York statute allowing 
humans to create inter vivos trusts for the care of animals.57 The lawsuits 
sought to have the chimpanzees moved to a sanctuary that confines 
chimpanzees but in a manner the lawsuits argued is preferable to the 
chimpanzees’ living situations at the time NhRP filed the lawsuits.58
A. People ex rel. Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Lavery (Lavery I)59
The Lavery I case has probably received the most attention of the 
related cases thus far, perhaps in part because it was the first of the cases 
to result in a published decision by an intermediate appellate court and in 
part because the appellate court directly addressed key issues. The more 
recent Lavery II decision also directly addressed key issues, and thus both 
Lavery decisions are likely to be cited and debated for many years as 
significant precedents regarding animals’ legal status. 
The Lavery cases involve a chimpanzee named Tommy who was kept 
by a private individual owner in upstate New York.60 After a lower court 
rejected the Lavery I lawsuit, the NhRP appealed to the Appellate 
                                                                                                                     
52. See 20 AM. JUR. TRIALS § 1, Westlaw (database updated Dec. 2016) (“The increasing 
resort to the federal courts by state prisoners, claiming to be unlawfully held by state authorities, 
for release on habeas corpus, has been described as a ‘tidal wave.’”).
53. See Lavery I Brief, supra note 49, at 45.
54. Id. at 46.
55. See Stanley, 16 N.Y.S.3d at 901; Presti, 999 N.Y.S.2d at 653; Lavery I, 998 N.Y.S.2d
at 249.
56. Lavery I Brief, supra note 49, at 77.
57. Id. at 49–52.
58. Id. at 1.
59. 998 N.Y.S.2d 248 (App. Div. 2014).
60. Id. at 249.
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Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Third Department.61
In December 2014, the appellate court released its unanimous opinion 
rejecting the Lavery I lawsuit.62 The court declined to base its ruling on 
deference to the legislature, asserting that the courts control the evolution 
of the writ of habeas corpus but stating that change is through “the slow 
process of decisional accretion.”63 In considering whether it should 
extend habeas corpus to chimpanzees, the court first noted that the law 
has never considered animals legal persons capable of asserting rights.64
The lack of precedent “does not, however, end the inquiry, as the writ has 
over time gained increasing use given its ‘great flexibility and vague 
scope.’”65
Quoting the author’s 2013 law review article Children, Chimps, and 
Rights Arguments from ‘Marginal’ Cases, and citing an earlier article by 
the author entitled Moving Beyond Animal Rights: A 
Legal/Contractualist Critique, the court based its rejection of the lawsuit 
on animals’ inability to bear societal “obligations and duties.”66 The court 
noted that “[r]eciprocity between rights and responsibilities stems from 
principles of social contract, which inspired the ideals of freedom and 
democracy at the core of our system of government.”67 The court added, 
“[u]nder this view, society extends rights in exchange for an express or 
implied agreement from its members to submit to social 
responsibilities.”68 In other words, “rights [are] connected to moral 
agency and the ability to accept societal responsibility in exchange for 
[those] rights.”69
In addition to these primary arguments, the court also cited Black’s 
Law Dictionary and other sources in concluding that “legal personhood 
has consistently been defined in terms of both rights and duties.”70 The 
court addressed the issue of corporations being granted legal personhood 
                                                                                                                     
61. Id. at 248. 
62. Id. at 249–52.
63. Id. at 249 (quoting People ex rel. Keitt v. McMann, 220 N.E.2d 653, 655 (N.Y. 1966)).
64. Id. at 249–50.
65. Id. at 250 (quoting McMann, 220 N.E.2d at 655).
66. Id.
67. Id. (first citing Cupp, Children and Chimps, supra note 29, at 12–14; then citing Cupp, 
Moving Beyond Animal Rights, supra note 29, at 69–70); see United States v. Barona, 56 F.3d 
1087, 1093–94 (9th Cir. 1995). Interestingly, John Locke, who is closely associated with the social 
contract ideals that strongly influenced the U.S. founders, expressly noted the connection between 
human ownership of animals and human responsibilities. He advocated giving dogs to children to 
care for “to develop tender feelings and a sense of responsibility for others.” James A. Serpell,
Animal-Assisted Interventions in Historical Perspective, in HANDBOOK ON ANIMAL-ASSISTED 
THERAPY 3, 25 (Aubrey H. Fine ed., 3d ed. 2015).
68. Lavery I, 998 N.Y.S.2d at 250.
69. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Cupp, Children and Chimps, supra note 29, at 13).
70. Id.
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by pointing out that they are associations of human beings and that they 
also bear duties.71
In rejecting the appeal, the court found it dispositive that, “unlike 
human beings, chimpanzees cannot bear any legal duties, submit to 
societal responsibilities or be held legally accountable for their actions.”72
Without specifically referencing the philosophical concept of an 
argument from marginal cases, the court recognized that some humans 
are less able than others to bear duties or submit to societal 
responsibilities.73 However, “[t]hese differences d[id] not alter [the 
court’s] analysis, as it is undeniable that, collectively, human beings 
possess the unique ability to bear legal responsibility. Accordingly, 
nothing in this decision should be read as limiting the rights of human 
beings in the context of habeas corpus proceedings or otherwise.”74
The Lavery I court concluded with an affirmation of the animal
welfare paradigm’s concern for the appropriate treatment of animals.75 It 
emphasized that the ruling does not leave chimpanzees “defenseless,”76
stating that legislatures have enacted many laws to protect animals in 
New York, including specific laws barring chimpanzees from being kept 
as pets in most circumstances.77 The court noted that further evolution of 
laws protecting chimpanzees is possible through the legislative process.78
Although the Lavery I court’s emphasis on the connection between 
rights and responsibilities is correct, elaborating on the nature of the 
connection would be useful in avoiding misunderstandings regarding the 
relationship of rights and duties for legal persons. This Article undertakes 
to elaborate on this connection recognized by the Lavery I court in Part 
III.79
The NhRP filed a motion with the State of New York Court of Appeals 
to appeal the intermediate court’s decision.80 Four amicus curiae briefs 
were filed in support of or in opposition to the motion, including an 
amicus curiae letter-brief by Professor Lawrence Tribe in support of the 
                                                                                                                     
71. Id. at 251.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 251 n.3.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 251–52.
76. Id. 
77. Id. at 251.
78. Id. at 251–52.
79. See infra Part III.
80. In “Tommy” Case, NhRP Seeks Appeal to New York’s Highest Court, NONHUMAN RTS.
PROJECT (Dec. 8, 2014), http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/2014/12/18/in-tommy-case-
nhrp-seeks-appeal-to-new-yorks-highest-court/. 
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motion.81 Professor Tribe argued that the Lavery I intermediate appellate 
court decision misunderstood the “crucial role” the common law writ of 
habeas corpus has historically played in “providing a forum to test the 
legality of someone’s ongoing restraint or detention.”82 He also asserted 
that habeas corpus serves “as a crucial guarantor of liberty by providing 
a judicial forum to beings the law does not (yet) recognize as having legal 
rights and responsibilities on a footing equal to others.”83
The common law writ of habeas corpus has indeed served as a vehicle 
for humans to test the legality of ongoing restraint.84 However, humans 
are not simply “beings,” they are human beings, and their legal 
personhood is anchored in the human community.85 If courts were to 
grant habeas corpus jurisdiction for any beings for whom an advocate 
wished to test the legality of restraint, would it be available for 
earthworms restrained in containers to be sold at gardening stores? If 
courts began to broadly allow habeas writs to test the legality of any 
nonhuman being’s restraint, and then focused only on the scope of habeas 
corpus relief to limit boundaries, they could be opening themselves up to 
habeas corpus claims for countless animals. 
The New York habeas corpus statute states that a “person,” or one 
acting on the person’s behalf, may petition for the writ.86 Thus, the 
jurisdiction question is related to the ultimate question of legal 
personhood under the statute’s language. Boundaries are needed for 
jurisdiction as well as for substantive relief, and among the beings of 
which we are presently aware, habeas corpus should be grounded only in
the human community.87
                                                                                                                     
81. Letter Brief of Amicus Curiae Laurence H. Tribe in Support of Motion for Leave to 
Appeal at 3, Lavery I, 998 N.Y.S.2d 248 (No. 518336) [hereinafter Letter Brief of Amicus 
Curiae], http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/7.-Exhibit-6-Tribe
-Amicus-Curiae-Letter-Brief.pdf. The court also allowed amicus curiae on the motion by The 
Center for the Study of the Great Ideas, Inc., by Professor Justin F. Marceau, and by the Center 
for Constitutional Rights. To view these orders individually, see People ex rel. Nonhuman Rights 
Project, Inc. v. Lavery, 38 N.E.3d 801 (N.Y. 2015); People ex rel. Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. 
v. Lavery, 38 N.E.3d 802 (N.Y. 2015); People ex rel. Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Lavery,
38 N.E.3d 802 (N.Y. 2015), respectively. 
82. Letter Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 81, at 3.
83. Id. at 4.
84. See generally id. (discussing how humans have the ability to test ongoing restraint 
because of habeas corpus).
85. See infra Section III.B.
86. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7002(a) (MCKINNEY 2016) (emphasis added). Section 7003, addressing 
“[w]hen the writ shall be issued,” also indicates it is for a “person.” N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7003(a) 
(MCKINNEY 2016).
87. This is not inconsistent with allowing habeas corpus and personhood for detainees held 
by the United States at Guantanamo Bay. The detainees are human. Although American courts 
have in some situations not granted full personhood to some subsets of humans (such as when the 
14
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The State of New York Court of Appeals denied the NhRP’s motion 
to appeal the intermediate court’s Lavery I decision without comment in 
September 2015.88
B. In re Nonhuman Rights Project v. Presti89
Like Lavery I, the NhRP filed the Presti case in late 2013.90 It involved 
a single chimpanzee, named Kiko, who was kept in New York by a 
private owner.91 The lawsuit was filed in Niagara County.92 The trial
court denied the NhRP’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of 
Kiko.93
In January 2015, approximately one month after the Third Department 
of the Appellate Division released its unanimous decision rejecting 
Lavery I, Fourth Department of the Appellate Division released a 
unanimous decision rejecting Presti.94 The Presti decision was short, and 
it was less direct than Lavery I in addressing animal legal personhood 
issues.95 The Presti court indicated that it did not need to address whether 
a chimpanzee could be a legal person.96 The court held that a writ of 
                                                                                                                     
odious practice of slavery was an American institution), because of personhood’s focus on 
humanity, American courts have never extended personhood beyond humans and human proxies. 
88. Lavery I, 998 N.Y.S.2d 248 (App. Div. 2014), appeal denied, 26 N.Y.3d 902 (2015) 
(table).
89. 999 N.Y.S.2d 652 (App. Div. 2015), appeal denied, 26 N.Y.3d 901 (2015) (table).
90. Michael Mountain, New York Cases – Judges’ Decisions and Next Steps, NHRP (Dec. 
10, 2013) http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/2013/12/10/new-york-cases-judges-decisions-
and-next-steps/. 
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Presti, 999 N.Y.S.2d at 653.
94. See id. at 654.
95. See id.
96. Id. at 653. The NhRP has since argued that 
the Presti court twice suggested, without deciding, that it might agree with the 
NhRP’s claim that Tommy was a “person” for the purpose of Article 70, stating, 
“[r]egardless of whether we agree with petitioner’s claim that Tommy is a person 
within the statutory and common law definition of the writ . . .” and “even 
assuming, arguendo, that we agreed with petitioner that Tommy should be 
deemed a person for purpose of the application . . . .”
Memorandum of Law in Support of Petition for Habeas Corpus at 71, Nonhuman Rights Project, 
Inc. v. Lavery, No. 162358/2015 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 2, 2015) [hereinafter Lavery II Brief]
(alterations in original), http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/
12/Memo-of-Law-Dec-2-2015.pdf.
There is nothing in the Presti decision that supports the NhRP’s assertion that the court 
“suggested” that it might agree that the law should consider Tommy a legal person. By stating 
that “even assuming, arguendo,” that it were to agree with NhRP on the personhood issue, the 
NhRP should lose, the court was simply highlighting its belief that it did not need to address the 
15
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habeas corpus is only available under New York law when, if successful, 
it would lead to “immediate release from custody.”97
The court asserted that the NhRP was not seeking immediate release 
from custody for Kiko, but rather was seeking custody in a different 
facility that the NhRP viewed as more appropriate.98 Confinement in a 
sanctuary, the court held, however preferable it might be to other forms 
of confinement, is not immediate release from confinement.99 Therefore, 
the court did not need to confront questions of legal personhood or 
standing, because “this matter is governed by the line of cases standing 
for the proposition that habeas corpus does not lie where a petitioner 
seeks only to change the conditions of confinement rather than the 
confinement itself.”100 The NhRP filed a motion with the State of New 
York Court of Appeals to appeal the intermediate court’s Presti decision, 
but the state’s high court denied the motion without comment together 
with its denial of the motion to appeal in Lavery I in September 2015.101
C. The Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Stanley102
The NhRP also filed Stanley in late 2013. The case involves two 
chimpanzees, named Hercules and Leo, who were used in research on 
bipedalism at Stony Brook University.103 In July 2015, the Associated 
Press reported that the research project involving the chimpanzees had 
ended and that “the chimps will be leaving the university . . . soon.”104
The NhRP initially filed Stanley in Suffolk County, New York, but after 
a lower court and an intermediate appellate court rejected it, the NhRP
refiled it in New York County.105
The Stanley case caused a brief but intense media sensation in April 
2015, when New York County Supreme Court Justice Barbara Jaffe 
scheduled a hearing on the case by signing a document entitled “Order to 
                                                                                                                     
novel personhood issue, since the court believed it could dismiss the lawsuit on more mundane 
grounds. Avoiding a novel and explosive issue by relying on a more mundane basis for dismissal 
is hardly a suggestion that the court might agree with the party making the novel argument.
97. Presti, 999 N.Y.S.2d at 653.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 653–54.
100. Id. at 654.
101. Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Presti, 17 N.Y.S.3d 81 (App. Div. 2015) (table) 
(denying motion for leave to appeal).
102. 16 N.Y.S.3d 898 (Sup. Ct. 2015).
103. Id. at 900–01.
104. Associated Press, Chimps Denied Legal Personhood Will Be Retired from Research,
TIMES FREE PRESS (July 31, 2015), http://www.timesfreepress.com/news/national/science/story/
2015/jul/31/chimps-denied-legal-personhood-will-be-retire/317605/.
105. Stanley, 16 N.Y.S.3d at 901.
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Show Cause & Writ of Habeas Corpus.”106 Several news accounts 
described the order as taking the groundbreaking step of issuing the first 
writ of habeas corpus for a nonhuman animal.107 However, in the wake 
of these news stories, Justice Jaffe quickly amended the order to strike 
the words “Writ of Habeas Corpus.”108 A spokesperson for the judge 
announced, “She did not say that a chimpanzee is a person . . . . She just 
gave them the opportunity to argue their case.”109
Following the hearing, which included oral arguments by the NhRP 
and by the Office of the State of New York Attorney General representing 
Stony Brook, Justice Jaffe ruled against the NhRP in July 2015.110 Justice 
Jaffe determined that the Lavery I appellate decision was controlling 
under stare decisis.111 Further, she believed the issue should be left to the 
legislature or to the State of New York Court of Appeals.112
Although the ruling emphasized that the law may evolve and took a 
sympathetic tone with some of the NhRP’s positions without highlighting 
some of the serious problems with the lawsuit, it did not advocate for 
animal legal personhood.113 Rather, the decision in rather vague dicta 
seemed to imply support more generally for further consideration of the 
issue without staking out a position.114 In further dicta, the decision 
expressly rejected using the past mistreatment of slaves, women, and 
other humans as an analogy for extending legal personhood to animals.115
In August 2015, the NhRP filed a notice of appeal regarding the lower 
court’s Stanley in the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, First 
                                                                                                                     
106. Amended Order to Show Cause, Stanley, 16 N.Y.S.3d 898 (No. 152736/2015)
[hereinafter Stanley Order to Show Cause], https://www.nonhumanrights.org/content/uploads/
Order-to-Show-Cause-Amended-4-21-15.pdf.
107. See, e.g., Rachel Feltman, Chimps Given Human Rights by U.S. Court for the First Time 
(Sort Of), WASH. POST (Apr. 22, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/speaking-of-
science/wp/2015/04/21/chimps-given-human-rights-by-u-s-court-for-the-first-time/; David 
Grimm, Updated: Judge’s Ruling Grants Legal Right to Research Chimps, SCIENCE (Apr. 20, 
2015, 11:45 PM), http://news.sciencemag.org/plants-animals/2015/04/judge-s-ruling-grants-
legal-right-research-chimps; New York Court Issues Habeas Corpus Writ for Chimpanzees, BBC
(Apr. 21, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-32396497.
108. Barbara Ross & Rich Schapiro, Chimpanzees Will Have Manhattan Court Hearing to 
Decide If They’re ‘Persons’ with Rights, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Apr. 22, 2015, 2:36 PM), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/chimps-nyc-court-hearing-decide-persons-article-1.2
193060.
109. Id.
110. Stanley, 16 N.Y.S.3d at 918.
111. Id. at 917.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 911–915.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 912.
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Judicial Department.116Apparently no further appellate pleadings have 
been filed in that case. In January 2016, the magazine, Science, reported 
that the two chimpanzees had been returned to their owners in Louisiana, 
“effectively ending a 2-year legal battle to have the animals declared legal 
persons.”117
D. Matter of Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Lavery (Lavery II)
After Lavery I was dismissed at the trial court and appellate levels, the 
NhRP filed Lavery II in New York County in late 2015. Lavery II is
essentially the same as Lavery I in what it seeks: issuance of a writ of 
habeas corpus for the chimpanzee named Tommy and relocation of 
Tommy to a chimpanzee sanctuary favored by the NhRP.118 The trial 
court dismissed Lavery II in December 2015, writing only: “Declined, to 
the extent that the . . . Third Dept. determined the legality of Tommy’s 
detention, an issue best addressed there, and absent any allegation or 
ground that is sufficiently distinct from those set forth in the first 
petition.”119 The NhRP then announced that it would appeal the
decision.120
The most notable distinction between NhRP’s initial brief in Lavery 
II and its initial brief in Lavery I is that the Lavery II Brief utilized
additions to previous expert affidavits and some new expert affidavits to 
                                                                                                                     
116. Notice of Appeal, Stanley, 16 N.Y.S.3d 898 (No. 162736/2015) [hereinafter Stanley
Notice of Appeal].
117. David Grimm, ‘Personhood’ Chimpanzees Returned to Owners, Ending Animal Rights 
Litigation, SCIENCE (Jan. 8, 2016, 12:30 PM), http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2016/01/
personhood-chimpanzees-returned-owners-ending-animal-rights-litigation. Earlier, in August
2015, the NhRP indicated that it was in negotiations with Stony Brook and with the New Iberia 
Research Center, which owns Hercules and Leo, regarding where they should transfer the 
chimpanzees given that the research project involving them had concluded. Notice of Appeal Filed 
in Hercules and Leo Case, NONHUMAN RTS. PROJECT (Aug. 20, 2015), 
http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/2015/08/20/notice-of-appeal-filed-in-hercules-and-leo-
case/. The NhRP indicated at that time that it would seek a preliminary injunction “pending the 
outcome of all appeals” if an effort were made to place the chimpanzees somewhere other than 
one of the sanctuaries that the NhRP deemed to be appropriate. Id.
118. See Lavery II Brief, supra note 96, at 1–3.
119. Order to Show Cause & Writ of Habeas Corpus, Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. 
Lavery, No. 162358/15 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 23, 2015).
120. See New York Trial Court Denies Tommy’s Second Bid for Freedom, NONHUMAN RTS.
PROJECT (Jan. 7, 2016), http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/2016/01/07/new-york-court-
denies-tommys-bid-for-freedom/. The trial court judge who dismissed Lavery II, Justice Barbara 
Jaffe, previously rejected the Stanley lawsuit that the NhRP also filed in New York County. See
Stanley, 16 N.Y.S.3d at 918. Later, in February 2016, Justice Jaffe also rejected the second Presti
lawsuit. See infra note 142. Many of the legal documents associated with the chimpanzee lawsuits 
are available at the Nonhuman Rights Project website. NONHUMAN RTS. PROJECT,
http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2017).
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seek to strengthen the argument already made in the Lavery I Brief that 
chimpanzees have some sense of moral responsibility and duty in their 
relationships.121 This attempted buttressing was in response to the Lavery
I court’s unanimous decision recognizing that chimpanzees are not 
persons in the legal system because they are not capable of bearing legal 
duties.122
Whether chimpanzees have some quality that could be described as a 
sense of moral responsibility and duty in their relationships is quite 
obviously not the pertinent question regarding legal personhood under 
our human legal system. Ants, whose ability to work together for the 
greater good of their colony is observable even by non-experts, could 
probably be described as having something like a sense of responsibility 
or duty toward the other ants in their colony or to the colony as a whole. 
Across many species of animals, mothers and, among some species, 
fathers demonstrate characteristics that probably could be described as a
sense of responsibility or duty for their young offspring. Perhaps any type 
of mature animal that lives cooperatively in some kind of family or group 
could be described as normally having something like a sense of 
responsibility to the other animals in the family or group. 
But of course the law does not assign legal duties to ants or to any 
other animals. The pertinent question is not whether chimpanzees possess 
anything that could be characterized as a sense of responsibility and duty,
but rather whether they possess sufficient moral responsibility to be held 
legally accountable and to possess legal rights under the human legal 
system. In 2012, when an adult chimpanzee at the Los Angeles Zoo beat 
a three-month-old baby chimpanzee in the head until the baby died, surely 
no authorities seriously contemplated charging the perpetrator in criminal 
court.123 Similarly, in 2009, when a chimpanzee attacked a woman in a 
manner that police described as “unprovoked” and “brutal and lengthy,” 
causing severe, life-threatening injuries, surely no authorities seriously 
considered bringing criminal battery charges against the chimpanzee.124
According to the NhRP website, its president Steven Wise has a poster 
at his home office that reads: “We may be the only lawyers on [E]arth 
                                                                                                                     
121. See, e.g., Lavery II Brief, supra note 96, at 113. Although the NhRP emphasizes the 
argument less in Lavery I, the Lavery I Brief also argues that chimpanzees have moral agency. 
See, e.g., Lavery I Brief, supra note 49, at 32.
122. Lavery I, 998 N.Y.S.2d 248, 251 (App. Div. 2015).
123. See Adult Chimpanzee Kills Baby Chimp in Front of Shocked Los Angeles Zoo Visitors,
CBS NEWS (June 27, 2012, 2:01 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/adult-chimpanzee-kills-
baby-chimp-in-front-of-shocked-los-angeles-zoo-visitors/.
124. Stephanie Gallman, Chimp Attack 911 Call: ‘He’s Ripping Her Apart,’ CNN (Feb. 18, 
2009), http://www.cnn.com/2009/US/02/17/chimpanzee.attack/index.html?iref=24hours.
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whose clients are always innocent.”125 This makes the point. The legal 
system appropriately does not view chimpanzees as possessing sufficient 
moral agency to be accountable under our human legal system. A typical 
prosecutor in the United States would not even entertain the idea of 
seeking to impose legal responsibilities on chimpanzees based on the 
concept of moral responsibility.126 Whether chimpanzees possess some 
degree of a quality that could be described as moral responsibility is 
irrelevant; they can only interact with our society in a manner that 
suggests they should be legal persons with rights and duties if they have 
sufficient moral responsibility to be held accountable under our laws. 
The Lavery II Brief also argued that the two law review articles cited 
by the Lavery I court “merely set forth Professor Cupp’s personal 
preference for an exceedingly narrow branch of 
philosophical . . . contractualism that arbitrarily excludes every 
nonhuman animal, while including every human being, in support of 
which he cites no cases.”127 An amicus brief filed opposing the appeal of 
Lavery I responded to a similar assertion by the NhRP that practically no 
philosophers have supported “rights for being human” by pointing out 
“the vast western philosophical canons to the contrary.”128 But at an even 
more fundamental level, noting that courts do not feel bound to strictly 
adhere to any academic philosophical theories would be an 
understatement. Philosophical theories may be useful in some endeavors, 
such as seeking to understand or explain the foundations of a society, but 
abstract theoretical philosophy is merely a tool at best. Judges seek justice 
at a broad level influenced by a multitude of factors and do not defer to 
the shifting sands of current majority, minority, and majority and 
minority branch positions among theoretical academic philosophers, 
most of whom have no legal training. Similarly, the author’s observations 
and analyses regarding our society and legal system, broadly connecting 
the concepts of rights and duties since this country’s foundation as a 
nation, are not a call for judicial endorsement of any formal academic 
                                                                                                                     
125. Michael Mountain, At Sundance, a Triumph for “Unlocking the Cage,” NONHUMAN 
RTS. PROJECT (Jan. 29, 2016), http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/2016/01/29/at-sundance-a-
triumph-for-unlocking-the-cage/.
126. Authorities restrain, confine, or even kill chimpanzees and other animals if they are a 
threat to humans or to other animals (whether killing a violent chimpanzee is ever appropriate is 
highly questionable, other than in a situation involving an imminent and very serious threat where 
no other options are available). See, e.g., Elizabeth Chuck, Harambe, Gorilla Killed at Cincinnati 
Zoo, ‘Had to Pay the Price’: Experts, NBC NEWS (June 1, 2016, 7:54 AM),
http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/harambe-gorilla-killed-cincinnati-zoo-had-pay-price-
experts-n583146. But this is based on a perceived need to protect humans, animals, or property, 
rather than based on a conclusion that the animal is morally blameworthy. See id.
127. Lavery II Brief, supra note 96, at 76.
128. Brief of Amicus Curiae Bob Kohn Against Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus at 17, 
Nonhuman Rights Project Inc. v. Lavery, No. 518336 (N.Y. App. Div. May 14, 2014).
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philosophical theories—or their branches—in all of their particulars. As
articulated throughout this Article and the author’s other writings, 
focusing legal personhood on humans and their proxies among the beings 
of which we are presently aware is not arbitrary, but is rather a
recognition that requiring legal accountability to each other as the norm 
in a community of humans—in some sense a social compact—is at the 
core of our human society and its legal system.
The history of rights expansion has been a history of focusing on the 
humanity of those who were previously denied rights. While there may 
be no case law before Lavery I expressly rejecting habeas corpus for 
animals because no reported lawsuits had previously made such a radical 
assertion, courts have readily rejected analogous claims. For example, 
when a lawsuit was brought seeking application of the Thirteenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution to orcas held in captivity, a U.S.
District Court dismissed the lawsuit in a short opinion because the 
Thirteenth Amendment “applies to persons, and [does not apply] to non-
persons such as orcas.”129 Further, numerous courts, including the U.S. 
Supreme Court, have noted the significance of the concept of a social 
compact in our legal system.130
Finally, as explained by Justice Jaffe in rejecting Lavery II at the trial 
court level the Lavery II Brief and its affidavits failed to provide any
“allegation or ground that is sufficiently distinct from those set forth in 
the first petition.”131 An argument that chimpanzees are capable of 
bearing some sorts of responsibilities appeared previously, albeit with 
less emphasis, in the Lavery I Brief that the court unanimously rejected 
in the Lavery I appellate decision.132
                                                                                                                     
129. Tilikum v. Sea World Parks & Entm’t, Inc., 842 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1263 (S.D. Cal. 
2012).
130. See generally Anita L. Allen, Social Contract Theory in American Law, 51 FLA. L. REV.
1, 2, 5–7 (1999) (discussing “Social Contract Theory” in case law). In a law review article
analyzing U.S. cases addressing aspects of social contract theory, Professor Anita Allen wrote 
that “[t]he legal system of the United States has an important relationship to social contract 
theory,” and that “[n]early six hundred years old, the early modern idea of the ‘social contract’ is 
going strong.” Id. at 2, 39.
131. Order to Show Cause & Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 119, at 2.
132. For example, the Lavery I Brief stated:
Chimpanzees appear to have moral inclinations and some level of moral 
agency; they behave in ways that, if we saw the same thing in humans, we would 
interpret as a reflection of moral imperatives. They ostracise individuals who 
violate social norms. They respond negatively to inequitable situations, e.g. when 
offered lower rewards than companions receiving higher ones, for the same task.
When given a chance to play economic games, such as the Ultimatum Game, 
they spontaneously make fair offers, even when not obliged to do so.
Lavery I Brief, supra note 49, at 32 (citations omitted).
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Shortly after the dismissal of the Lavery II case by the trial court in
January 2016, the Nonhuman Rights Project filed its most recent lawsuit,
Presti II, involving the same parties named in the Presti I case, in New 
York County, a different county in New York from where it filed the
Presti I lawsuit.133 The Presti II case and its initial brief are similar to the 
Lavery II case and initial brief. The same trial court judge who dismissed 
Lavery II dismissed Presti II in February 2016 with a short statement that 
it did not raise sufficient changed circumstances from the Presti I lawsuit;
the NhRP then indicated it would appeal.134
In June 2017, the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New 
York, First Department, issued its Lavery II decision rejecting both the 
Lavery II and Presti II appeals.135 The court recognized that the NhRP’s 
new affidavits and additions to affidavits “cannot be said to be in response 
to or counter to” the Lavery I decision, because Lavery I “did not dispute 
the cognitive or social abilities of chimpanzees.”136 Rather, Lavery I
simply observed that chimpanzees cannot bear legal duties or be held 
legally accountable.137
In a paragraph referencing an amicus curiae brief submitted by the 
author, the court pointed out that “[t]he asserted cognitive and linguistic 
capabilities of chimpanzees do not translate to a chimpanzee’s capacity 
or ability, like humans, to bear legal duties, or to be held legally 
accountable for their actions.”138 Further, the court rejected comparisons 
to an infant being recognized as a legal person despite lacking legal 
accountability. It noted that “[t]his argument ignores the fact that these 
are still human beings, members of the human community.”139 The court 
added that the issue of whether to grant fundamental rights to animals is 
“better suited to the legislative process.”140
Thus, as of the writing of this Article, all of the courts making 
decisions on the chimpanzee personhood lawsuits have rejected them.141
By the author’s count, at least twenty-eight New York judges have 
                                                                                                                     
133. See NhRP Re-Files Habeas Corpus Case on Behalf of Kiko in New York, NONHUMAN 
RTS. PROJECT (Jan. 12, 2016), http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/2016/01/12/nhrp-re-files-
habeas-corpus-case-on-behalf-of-kiko-in-new-york/.
134. See New York Supreme Court Judge Denies Kiko’s Second Habeas Corpus Bid,
NONHUMAN RTS. PROJECT (Feb. 11, 2016), http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/2016/02/11/
new-york-trial-court-denies-kikos-latest-habeas-corpus-bid/.
135. 54 N.Y.S.3d 392 (App. Div. 2017).
136. Id. at 395.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 396.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 397.
141. See supra Sections I.A–D.
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participated in ruling against the lawsuits thus far.142 However, as noted 
above, lawsuits seeking intelligent-animal personhood are in their 
infancy, and regardless of whether any of the current lawsuits fail or 
succeed, the ultimate legal resolution of this issue over the course of time 
is far from certain.143
II. FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL PERSONHOOD FOR COGNITIVELY 
IMPAIRED HUMANS
Regardless of whether the philosophical construct is formally labeled
as such in legal briefs, the “argument from marginal cases” is a core 
element of assertions that the law should grant intelligent animals some 
form of personhood.144 If the law considers humans with little or no 
cognitive ability legal persons with rights, the argument goes, justice 
demands also granting some form of personhood or legal standing 
through a guardian for animals that have stronger practical autonomy than 
the less intelligent human persons.145 In the New York lawsuits, the 
NhRP used chimpanzees’ significantly higher degree of practical 
autonomy than that possessed by some humans whom the law
nonetheless considers legal persons to argue that justice demands 
granting legal personhood to the chimpanzees as well.146
A fundamental flaw in this reasoning is that the legal personhood of 
humans with cognitive impairments is not, nor should be, grounded in 
                                                                                                                     
142. This includes one lower court judge each for Lavery I and the first Presti lawsuit, two 
lower court judges for the Stanley lawsuit (one of these judges, Justice Barbara Jaffe, dismissed 
three of the lawsuits: Stanley, Lavery II, and the second Presti lawsuit), five unanimous 
intermediate appellate judges each for the Lavery I and Presti I lawsuits, four intermediate 
appellate judges for the Stanley lawsuit, at least five judges of the New York Court of Appeals in 
the its decision denying the NhRP’s motion to appeal the intermediate appellate rulings in Lavery 
I and in  Presti I, and five unanimous intermediate appellate judges for the Lavery II/Presti II 
decision.
143. See supra notes 17–18 and accompanying text.
144. See Cupp, Children and Chimps, supra note 29, at 19–30. See generally DOMBROWSKI,
supra note 19 (discussing the “argument from marginal cases”).
145. See supra notes 19–25 and accompanying text.
146. The Lavery I Brief argues: 
The NhRP agrees that humans who have never been sentient nor conscious nor 
possessed of a brain should have legal rights. But if humans bereft of autonomy, 
self-determination, sentience, consciousness, even a brain, are entitled to 
personhood and legal rights, then this Court must either recognize Tommy’s just 
equality claim to bodily liberty or reject equality entirely.
Lavery I Brief, supra note 49, at 73. For a challenge questioning why the NhRP believes that 
humans with no cognitive abilities or sentience should have legal rights given the arguments in 
its briefs, see infra notes 268–73 and accompanying text.
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individual cognitive capacity.147 Indeed, this Part will demonstrate that 
the history of legal personhood and rights for humans with cognitive 
impairments is a history of emphasizing that cognitive impairments are 
not an appropriate excuse for withholding rights from human beings.
Rather, this Part will show that courts and legislatures have appropriately 
based legal personhood for humans with cognitive impairments on their 
dignity interests as members of the human community. The level of 
cognitive capacity human beings possess counts in determining which 
specific rights and responsibilities the law might assign them, but 
cognitive capacity does not count at all in the more fundamental question 
of whether individual humans are legal persons whom the law should 
assign at least some fundamental rights. Shifting the focus from humanity 
to individual intelligence would run counter to both the foundations of 
personhood, as set forth in cases and statutes addressing cognitively 
impaired humans, and sound reasoning.148
Humans with cognitive impairments did not fare well in early 
recorded history. “The ancient Greeks and Romans felt that children with 
[intellectual disabilities] were born because the gods had been angered. 
Often children with severe [intellectual disabilities] would be allowed to 
die of exposure as infants rather than being permitted to grow up.”149 The 
Christian scriptures written during the Pax Romana reflect that people 
commonly believed sins committed by a person’s parent caused that
person’s physical disabilities—although Jesus taught his followers that
this belief was incorrect.150 However, despite negative views about 
humans with cognitive impairments, Roman society recognized legal 
personhood for at least some children with cognitive impairments.151 If 
they were from wealthy families, Roman children with cognitive 
impairments could have property rights and legal guardians.152
In Renaissance Europe, Spain began creating asylums for persons 
with cognitive impairments, mental illnesses, or both in the fifteenth and 
                                                                                                                     
147. For a discussion of whether cognitive capacity might be a distinctive basis for finding 
legal personhood in addition to other reasons beings might be considered legal persons, see infra 
notes 268–73 and accompanying text.
148. This focus on humanity as a foundation of legal personhood is not arbitrary because, as 
set forth below, human beings and their proxies are the only beings for whom the norm is to 
engage in human society with duties and rights. See infra Section III.B.
149. CATHERINE K. HARBOUR & PALLAB K. MAULIK, CTR. FOR INT’L REHAB. RESEARCH INFO.
& EXCH., HISTORY OF INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY 1 (2010), http://cirrie.buffalo.edu/encyclopedia/
en/pdf/history_of_intellectual_disability.pdf.
150. John 9:1–3.
151. HARBOUR & MAULIK, supra note 149, at 1.
152. Id.
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sixteenth centuries.153 Although similar asylums spread to the Americas 
in Canada and Mexico in the 1700s, they did not appear in the United 
States until the Jacksonian Era in the 1820s.154
In the early and mid-1800s in the United States, “optimism prevailed 
for the chances of rehabilitating, training, and reintegrating [people with 
intellectual disabilities] into ‘normal’ life.”155 Although these people
increasingly lived in asylums, training was often undertaken through 
systematic programs.156 Early asylums in the United States were 
sometimes, but not always, private, and the costs of private treatment 
“rendered them inadequate to meet the needs of the poorer classes, 
particularly the growing populations of urban poor in America’s 
developing cities.”157
Throughout the nineteenth century, asylums for people with cognitive 
impairments continued to grow,158 but the early optimism that individuals 
with cognitive impairments could be trained into “normalcy” waned.159
Overcrowding in asylums became commonplace.160 Further, institutions 
were often segregated into different sections for the privileged and the 
poor classes.161
In addition to experiencing a large influx of poor immigrants, the 
United States was in the midst of rapid changes brought on by the 
Industrial Revolution.162 Employment “increasingly depended on 
intellectual ability and less so on physical ability,” and this 
transformation limited training and work options for people with 
cognitive impairments.163 Overcrowded facilities, inadequate treatment 
resources (especially for the poor), and reduced societal need for manual 
labor perhaps combined to generate more negative societal attitudes 
toward people with cognitive impairments.164 Increasingly, the 
“‘feebleminded[]’ were blamed for the poverty, illness, and crime that 
                                                                                                                     
153. David L. Braddock & Susan L. Parish, Social Policy Toward Intellectual Disabilities in 
the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, in THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH INTELLECTUAL 
DISABILITIES: DIFFERENT BUT EQUAL 83, 83–84 (Stanley S. Herr et al. eds., 2003).
154. Id. 
155. HARBOUR & MAULIK, supra note 149, at 2; see Braddock & Parish, supra note 153, at 
85–86.
156. Id.
157. Braddock & Parish, supra note 153, at 85.
158. Id.
159. HARBOUR & MAULIK, supra note 149, at 2.
160. Braddock & Parish, supra note 153, at 86.
161. Id. at 85.
162. Rise of Industrial America, 1876–1900, LIBR. CONGRESS, http://www.loc.gov/teachers/
classroommaterials/presentationsandactivities/presentations/timeline/riseind/ (last visited Jan. 4,
2017).
163. HARBOUR & MAULIK, supra note 149, at 2.
164. See id.
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accompanied urbanization.”165 Over time, a “fearful, alarmist attitude 
toward [persons with intellectual disabilities] developed.”166
Against this backdrop, the eugenics movement started gaining 
prominence in the late 1800s.167 This movement, which was related to 
social Darwinism, viewed intellectual disabilities as “inherited as a 
Mendelian characteristic that degraded the species.”168 “Those who 
supported the eugenics movement felt that medicine interfered with 
Darwinian natural selection and kept the weak alive.”169
In the United States during the eugenics era, which lasted from about 
1880 through the beginning of World War II, physicians often would not 
treat infants born with “disabilities and birth defects,” leading to many 
deaths.170 “Newspaper accounts publicized the withholding of lifesaving 
treatment of babies with disabilities during the decade after 1915, and 
movies propagating the eugenics agenda became quite common.”171
Several states passed laws authorizing sterilization.172 Indiana passed 
the first such law in 1907,173 but Virginia’s forced sterilization statute 
became particularly prominent in the United States because of Buck v. 
Bell,174 a decision by the U.S. Supreme Court holding that the law was 
constitutional.175 The sterilization statute in Virginia set forth that the 
superintendent of certain institutions, including “the State Colony for 
Epileptics and Feeble Minded,” was empowered to “have the operation 
performed upon any patient afflicted with hereditary forms of insanity, 
imbecility, [etc.], on complying with the very careful provisions by which 
the act protects the patients from possible abuse.”176
The statute indicated that the legislature intended it to serve the “best 
interests of the patients and of society.”177 It asserted that the state is 
burdened with caring for many “defective persons” who “would become 
a menace” if released into society without being sterilized, but who could 
safely be released into society if first rendered incapable of 
reproducing.178 This would allow them to “become self-supporting with 
                                                                                                                     
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 3.
168. Braddock & Parish, supra note 153, at 90.
169. HARBOUR & MAULIK, supra note 149, at 2.
170. Braddock & Parish, supra note 153, at 91. 
171. Id.
172. HARBOUR & MAULIK, supra note 149, at 2.
173. Id. at 3.
174. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
175. Id. at 207–08.
176. Id. at 205–06.
177. Id. at 206.
178. Id. at 205–06.
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benefit to themselves and to society.”179
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote the majority opinion upholding 
the statute.180 He described a woman named Carrie Buck, who was 
chosen for sterilization at the institution, as a “feeble minded” eighteen 
year-old patient.181 Ms. Buck had given birth to a child described by 
Justice Holmes as “illegitimate” and “feeble minded.”182 Ms. Buck’s 
mother was also intellectually disabled and was also a patient at the 
institution.183
Ms. Buck challenged the order that she be sterilized as a violation of 
due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.184
Justice Holmes noted that “[t]he attack is not upon the procedure but upon 
the substantive law. It seems to be contended that in no circumstances 
could such an order be justified.”185
Justice Holmes’s rejection of the constitutional challenge is 
infamous.186 Perhaps remembering the bloody Civil War of which he was 
a veteran, he seemed exasperated by the challenge to forced sterilization:
We have seen more than once that the public welfare may 
call upon the best citizens for their lives. It would be strange 
if it could not call upon those who already sap the strength 
of the State for these lesser sacrifices, often not felt to be 
such by those concerned, in order to prevent our being 
swamped with incompetence. It is better for all the world, if 
instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime,
or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent 
those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind.187
He thus dismissed the lawsuit with the statement that “[t]hree generations 
of imbeciles are enough.”188
Nazi Germany wholeheartedly embraced the idea of sterilizing people 
it considered undesirable, initially modeling its approach on a statute 
                                                                                                                     
179. Id. at 206.
180. Id. at 205.
181. Id. 
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 207.
186. Patricia Alten, GINA: A Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Solution in Search of 
a Problem, 61 FLA. L. REV. 379, 381 n.10 (2009) (“Some of the most famous words in America’s 
history on genetic discrimination are found in a Supreme Court opinion upholding the eugenic 
sterilization of eighteen-year-old mentally-handicapped Carrie Buck in Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 
200, 205, 208 (1927).”).
187. Buck, 274 U.S. at 207.
188. Id.
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enacted in California.189 Later, Nazi Germany took a more direct 
approach, euthanizing many people with cognitive impairments, mental 
illness, or physical limitations.190
Following the horrors of World War II, social Darwinism and 
eugenics fell out of favor in the United States.191 Although progress came 
in fits and starts, the Post-War Era was characterized by a new emphasis 
on human rights that gradually extended to persons with cognitive 
impairments.192 This evolution has focused on human dignity as a basis 
of legal personhood and rights and has rejected individual intelligence or 
autonomy as a necessary foundation of legal personhood for humans. In 
his book Rattling the Cage, published in 2000, Steven Wise wrote that 
“[h]aving dignity-rights without autonomy is a little like being a bird 
without feathers or a Buddhist pope.”193 But he concedes that “a 
succession of post-World War II treaties, constitutions, and judicial 
decisions have created just such a category of rights-holders.”194 If Mr. 
Wise’s book seeks to assert that assigning rights to human beings who 
lack autonomy is illogical, he is incorrect. But even if he finds it illogical, 
Mr. Wise is correct in observing that modern courts have divorced human 
rights from analyses of individual human intelligence or autonomy.
In 1948, the United Nations adopted The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (the Declaration).195 The Declaration begins with the 
affirmation that “recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and
inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation 
of freedom, justice and peace in the world.”196 It made clear that 
inalienable rights were based on inherent human dignity rather than on 
characteristics of individual beings.197 Mary Robinson, the former 
President of Ireland and the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, has lamented that although the Declaration “affirms that 
we are all born free and equal in dignity and in rights,” discrimination 
against persons with disabilities was “virtually neglected” in the human 
rights movement’s early years.198 However, writing in 2003, she opined 
                                                                                                                     
189. See Edwin Black, The Horrifying American Roots of Nazi Eugenics, HIST. NEWS 
NETWORK (Sept. 2003), http://historynewsnetwork.org/article/1796. 
190. Id. 
191. Michael G. Silver, Eugenics and Compulsory Sterilization Laws: Providing Redress for 
the Victims of a Shameful Era in United States History, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 862, 863 (2004).
192. See id.
193. WISE, supra note 17, at 244.
194. Id.
195. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948).
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Mary Robinson, Foreword to THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH INTELLECTUAL 
DISABILITIES, supra note 153, at v, v.
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that “this oversight has slowly been reversed.”199
The Declaration, which as President Robinson noted has increasingly 
included a call to recognize human rights for persons with disabilities, is 
firmly and unapologetically grounded in notions of humanity. As 
Professors Harold Kho and Lawrence Gostin explained, “Since the 
Second World War, international human rights have been defined as 
embracing those universally recognized inalienable rights to whose 
enjoyment all persons are entitled solely by virtue of being born 
human.”200 Individual intelligence and individual autonomy are not 
factors in assigning human rights.
During the 1950s, many parents of persons with intellectual 
disabilities joined together to form the National Association for Retarded 
Children, which is now known as The ARC.201 In 1950, The ARC’s 
“constitution was drawn up with the broad purposes to promote the 
welfare of mentally retarded persons of all ages and to prevent mental 
retardation. These goals have remained constant.”202 However, the 
organization increased its action based explicitly on rights concepts over 
time.203 “Beginning in the early 1970’s NARC and state associations 
assisted in the preparation of court suits to defend the rights of the 
mentally retarded in state institutions. It became a strong supporter of 
‘deinstitutionalization’ and ‘normalization.’”204
In “1961, President Kennedy issued an unprecedented statement 
regarding the need for a national plan in the field of intellectual 
disabilities.”205 He created the President’s Panel on Mental Retardation, 
which issued “broad and far-reaching” recommendations, including 
expanded civil rights protections.206 Congress enacted many of the 
panel’s recommendations into new laws.207
In the 1970s, legislative action and litigation protecting the rights of 
persons with cognitive limitations expanded significantly.208 In 1971, 
Congress created the Intermediate Care Facilities/Mental Retardation 
(ICF/MR) program.209 It supplied federal funding for facilities providing
                                                                                                                     
199. Id.
200. Harold Hongju Koh & Lawrence O. Gostin, Introduction to THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF 
PERSONS WITH INTELLECTUAL DISABILITIES, supra note 153, at 1, 1 (emphasis added).
201. See Braddock & Parish, supra note 153, at 94.
202. Robert Segal, The National Association for Retarded Citizens, ARC,
http://www.thearc.org/who-we-are/history/segal-account (last visited Jan. 4, 2017). 
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Braddock & Parish, supra note 153, at 95.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
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services for intellectually disabled people provided the facilities 
complied with federal quality standards.210 Federal government funding 
ran from fifty percent to seventy-eight percent of the institutional care 
costs, and these large subsidies strongly incentivized states to meet the 
federal standards.211 Although Congress did not direct this law 
specifically at rights or legal personhood, it had a strong practical effect 
in improving conditions for persons with cognitive impairments.212
The 1971 case Wyatt v. Stickney,213 decided by a U.S. District Court 
in Alabama, has also been described as a landmark development for the 
rights movement.214 In Wyatt, mentally ill and intellectually disabled 
patients were kept in a state facility but did not receive appropriate 
treatment or therapy.215 The court held that “[t]o deprive any citizen of 
his or her liberty upon the altruistic theory that the confinement is for 
humane therapeutic reasons and then fail to provide adequate treatment 
violates the very fundamentals of due process.”216 In enforcing due 
process rights for people with mental illnesses and cognitive 
impairments, the court saw no need to address whether they were legal 
persons in light of their limited capacities.217 It correctly assumed that as 
humans they are entitled to the same due process rights as other citizens, 
regardless of their limitations.218
The Wyatt ruling led to a “tidal wave” of federal class actions 
demanding appropriate conditions in institutions housing people with 
intellectual disabilities and also inspired similar class actions demanding 
the right to education for people with intellectual disabilities.219
In 1975, Congress passed the Education of All Handicapped Children 
Act220 (now known as IDEA, the Individuals with Disabilities Education 
Act).221 IDEA “guaranteed access to a free, appropriate, public education 
(FAPE) in the least restrictive environment to every child with a 
                                                                                                                     
210. Id.
211. Id. at 95–96.
212. Id. at 96.
213. 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), aff’d sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 
(5th Cir. 1974).
214. Braddock & Parish, supra note 153, at 95.
215. Wyatt, 325 F. Supp. at 782–84.
216. Id. at 785.
217. See id.
218. See id.
219. Braddock & Parish, supra note 153, at 96.
220. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1405–
06, 1415–20 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004)).
221. Pub. L. No. 108-446, 118 Stat. 2647 (2004) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1400 
(2012)); Braddock & Parish, supra note 153, at 95; IDEA—35 Years Later, U.S. DEP’T EDUC.,
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/osers/idea35/index.html (last modified June 6, 2012).
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disability.”222 As with the other post-World War II statutes expanding 
rights for persons with cognitive impairments, IDEA is grounded firmly 
in the humanity of such persons.223 The current version of the Act states 
that “[d]isability is a natural part of the human experience and in no way 
diminishes the right of individuals to participate in or contribute to 
society.”224 Rather than basing rights on cognitive abilities or other 
abilities, the law, like other legislation extending rights to persons with 
cognitive impairments, expressly rejects the idea that disability 
diminishes full legal personhood.
Beginning in the mid-1980s and continuing to the present, “the trend 
in the U.S. has been for individuals with [intellectual disabilities] to live 
in inclusive community settings, with appropriate supports to facilitate 
their experience.”225 The language of legal rights has increasingly 
replaced the language of altruism in describing why society must consider 
the interests of these legal persons. Courts and activists increasingly 
recognize that humans with cognitive impairments have fundamental 
rights to, among other things, liberty, due process, and the pursuit of 
happiness.226
Recognizing that humans with cognitive impairments are full and 
equal legal persons based on their inalienable rights does not mean that it 
is inappropriate to consider their limitations in recognizing specific rights 
and responsibilities. A book addressing the human rights of persons with 
intellectual disabilities recognizes this principle in its subtitle, “Different 
but Equal.”227 Although the law must recognize full personhood for a
human with severe cognitive impairments in recognition of their human 
dignity, the person may not be competent to, for example, drive an 
automobile or to personally manage their financial affairs.228
Regarding responsibilities, in 2002, the Supreme Court held in Atkins 
                                                                                                                     
222. IDEA—35 Years Later, supra note 221.
223. See id.
224. 20 U.S.C. § 1400.
225. HARBOUR & MAULIK, supra note 149, at 5.
226. See generally Michael W. Smull & Luciene Parsley, Liberty, Due Process, and the 
Pursuit of Happiness, in THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH INTELLECTUAL DISABILITIES, supra 
note 153, at 185, 185–203 (citing Cruzan v. Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (protecting 
a competent person’s right to refuse medical care); then citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 
307 (1982) (recognizing a due process protection from undue bodily restraint); and then citing 
Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976) (discussing the balancing of State and individual 
interests)).
227. See supra note 153; see also Harold Hongiu Koh, Different but Equal: The Human 
Rights of Persons with Intellectual Disabilities, 63 MD. L. REV. 1, 8 (2004) (“Our book calls on 
the world to make concrete the principle of ‘different but equal.’ That task is easier said than 
done.” (footnote omitted)).
228. See Myrna Stahman, Legal Planning for the Mentally Retarded, 10 IDAHO L. REV. 245,
246 (1974).
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v. Virginia229 that it is not constitutional to impose the death penalty on a 
person with an intellectual disability.230 In Atkins, defendant Daryl 
Renard Atkins was convicted of robbing and murdering a man with an 
accomplice.231 Atkins’ prior felony convictions and other factors made 
this an aggravating circumstances case eligible for the death penalty.232
However, in the penalty phase of the trial, a forensic psychologist 
identified Atkins as “mildly . . . retarded,” with a “full scale IQ of 59.”233
The jury nonetheless sentenced Atkins to death.234 After the Virginia 
Supreme Court ordered a second sentencing hearing, the State presented 
another psychologist as an expert witness testifying that Atkins was not 
mentally retarded.235 The jury again sentenced Atkins to death.236 The 
Virginia Supreme Court upheld the sentence, despite Atkins’s claim that 
he should be spared the death penalty because of his intellectual 
disability.237
The U.S. Supreme Court analyzed whether imposing the death penalty 
on an intellectually disabled criminal violated the Eighth Amendment’s 
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.238 It noted a consistent trend 
among states and the federal government to enact legislation banning the 
death penalty for intellectually disabled criminals.239 The court reasoned:
Mentally retarded persons frequently know the difference 
between right and wrong and are competent to stand trial.
Because of their impairments, however, by definition they 
have diminished capacities to understand and process 
information, to communicate, to abstract from mistakes and 
learn from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, to 
control impulses, and to understand the reactions of others.
There is no evidence that they are more likely to engage in 
criminal conduct than others, but there is abundant evidence 
that they often act on impulse rather than pursuant to a 
premeditated plan, and that in group settings they are 
followers rather than leaders. Their deficiencies do not 
warrant an exemption from criminal sanctions, but they do 
                                                                                                                     
229. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
230. Id. at 321.
231. Id. at 307.
232. Id. at 308.
233. Id. at 308–09.
234. Id. at 309.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 310.
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diminish their personal culpability.240
The Court concluded that because of these limitations, both the 
deterrence and retribution rationales for the death penalty were 
compromised in cases involving defendants with intellectual 
disabilities.241 Thus, under the Eighth Amendment’s “evolving standards 
of decency,” the court held “that such punishment is excessive and that 
the Constitution ‘places a substantive restriction on the State’s power to 
take the life’ of a mentally retarded offender.”242
The Atkins decision illustrates the concept of inalienable human rights 
for humans that are “different but equal.” The court recognized that some 
persons with intellectual disabilities may have a significant degree of 
moral agency, and that to the extent that they do, they must be held 
accountable for their crimes.243 However, it also recognized the reality 
that significant intellectual limitations call for limitations on the harshest 
punishments that society may inflict for crimes.244 As human beings, 
persons with cognitive impairments must be treated with equality under 
the law, but the equality analysis may take into account capabilities or 
lack of capabilities.
The most powerful illustration of the primacy of humanity in the legal 
personhood of individuals with cognitive impairments involves the rights 
of humans who are in a persistent vegetative state. Several U.S. courts 
have recognized that even humans with virtually no cognitive functioning 
and humans with very low cognitive functioning are legal persons entitled 
to rights based on human dignity.245 As a Kentucky court stated in 2004, 
“It is . . . universally accepted that the state may not deprive citizens of 
their constitutional rights solely because they do not possess the 
decisional capacity to personally exercise them.”246
For example, in In re Guardianship of L.W.,247 the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court addressed a case involving a seventy-nine-year-old man 
who had been institutionalized for thirty-eight years with “a long history 
of chronic undifferentiated schizophrenia.”248 The man then suffered a 
cardiac arrest that left him in a persistent vegetative state.249 In holding 
that the man had a constitutional right to decide through the substituted 
                                                                                                                     
240. Id. at 318 (footnotes omitted).
241. Id. at 318–20.
242. Id. at 321 (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1986) (addressing the death 
penalty for mentally ill defendants)).
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245. See infra notes 247–60 and accompanying text.
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judgment of a guardian whether to refuse further medical treatment under 
certain conditions, the court reasoned:
[B]y standards of logic, morality and medicine the 
terminally ill should be treated equally, whether competent 
or incompetent. Can it be doubted that the “value of human 
dignity extends to both”? What possible societal policy 
objective is vindicated or furthered by treating the two 
groups of terminally ill differently? What is gained by 
granting such a fundamental right only to those who, though 
terminally ill, have not suffered brain damage and coma in 
the last stages of the dying process? The very notion raises 
the spectre of constitutional infirmity when measured 
against the Supreme Court’s recognition that incompetents 
must be afforded all their due process rights; indeed any 
State scheme which irrationally denies to the terminally ill 
incompetent that which it grants to the terminally ill 
competent patient is plainly subject to constitutional 
attack.250
Perhaps an even more dramatic affirmation of the legal personhood 
and rights of humans with even severe cognitive impairments arises when 
the person is an infant in a persistent vegetative state.251 In this situation, 
not only does the human seemingly have no hope of any autonomy in the 
future, they also have not previously experienced significant 
autonomy.252
In 1992, the Massachusetts Supreme Court confronted these sad facts 
in the case of Care & Protection of Beth.253 In this case, the infant named 
Beth was in an automobile accident when she was approximately three 
months old.254 The straps in Beth’s car seat wrapped around her neck, 
depriving her of oxygen and leaving her in “an irreversible coma.”255 A
medical expert testified that “in his opinion, the child does not feel pain, 
or at least is not ‘able to localize it.’”256
The child’s guardian argued that efforts to resuscitate Beth should be 
taken if needed, and that such efforts cannot be an invasion of Beth’s 
                                                                                                                     
250. Id. at 68–69 (first emphasis added) (quoting Eichner v. Dillon, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517, 542–
43 (App. Div. 1980)). In re Guardianship of L.W. is cited and briefly quoted in WISE, supra note 
17, at 244.
251. See infra notes 253–60 and accompanying text.
252. See infra notes 253–60 and accompanying text.
253. 587 N.E.2d 1377, 1378 (Mass. 1992). Steven Wise discusses this case both in WISE,
supra note 17, at 244–45, and in WISE, supra note 20, at 237–38.
254. Beth, 587 N.E.2d at 1378.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 1379.
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dignity.257 The guardian stated “that the child ‘has no cognitive ability 
and therefore will suffer no “indignity” that the medical care might be 
supposed to produce in a conscious person.’”258
The court bristled at this assertion, retorting that “[i]n the law of this 
jurisdiction, incompetent people are entitled to the same respect, dignity 
and freedom of choice as competent people.”259 The court concluded that 
under the substituted judgment doctrine as applicable to the facts of this 
case, Beth would choose not to be resuscitated if in cardiac arrest and thus 
upheld a “do not resuscitate” order imposed by a lower court.260
Every aspect of the history of legal rights for humans with cognitive 
impairments refutes the argument that individual cognitive ability should 
be a foundation of legal personhood and legal rights. Rather than 
supporting the supposed significance of individual cognitive ability to 
personhood, courts and legislatures have gone in the opposite direction, 
relying on inalienable human dignity rather than individual intelligence 
as the basis for rights. As Part III will demonstrate, the legal system has 
acted appropriately in maintaining its rights focus on human dignity and 
not on individual intelligence.
III. LEGAL PERSONHOOD FOR HUMANS WITH COGNITIVE IMPAIRMENTS
DOES NOT SUPPORT LEGAL PERSONHOOD FOR INTELLIGENT ANIMALS
Radically restructuring our legal system to base personhood on 
individual cognitive ability would create dangerous societal threats.
Furthermore, our recognition of legal personhood for humans with 
cognitive impairments does not present an equality dilemma in declining 
to assign personhood to intelligent animals such as chimpanzees. This 
Part will demonstrate that seeking to apply an equality principle between 
cognitively impaired humans and intelligent animals presents particularly 
serious risks for cognitively impaired humans. This Part also articulates 
why legal personhood is anchored only in the human community and its 
proxies. Finally, this Part explains why, even if an equality comparison 
under the argument from marginal cases were undertaken, cognitively 
impaired humans are distinct from intelligent animals in ways that would 
discredit the comparison.
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A. Legal Personhood for Intelligent Animals Would Pose Threats to 
Humans with Serious Cognitive Impairments
One of the most serious concerns about legal personhood for 
intelligent animals should be that it presents an unintended, long-term, 
and perhaps not immediately obvious threat to humans—particularly to 
humans with serious cognitive impairments. As set forth in the argument 
from marginal cases, humans with serious cognitive impairments may 
have no capacity for autonomy or less capacity for autonomy than some 
animals.261 To be clear, supporting personhood based on animals’ 
intelligence does not imply that one wants to reduce the protections 
afforded humans with cognitive impairments. Indeed, the New York 
chimpanzee lawsuits seem to advocate pulling smart animals up in legal 
consideration, rather than seeking to push humans with cognitive 
impairments down.262
For example, the Lavery I Brief states:
Homo sapiens membership has been laudably designated 
a sufficient condition for legal personhood. Even the 
permanently comatose and anencephalic of our species 
humans are entitled to fundamental legal rights under 
international and American law. However, “the thesis that 
humans should be ascribed rights simply for being human 
has received practically no support from philosophers.” 
. . . 
The NhRP agrees that humans who have never been 
sentient nor conscious nor possessed of a brain should have 
basic legal rights. But if humans bereft of autonomy, self-
determination, sentience, consciousness, even a brain, are 
entitled to personhood and legal rights, then this Court must 
either recognize Tommy’s just equality claim to bodily 
liberty or reject equality entirely.263
Despite the NhRP’s good intentions about maintaining basic legal 
rights for all humans regardless of the severity of their cognitive 
impairments, there should be deep concern that over a long horizon, 
                                                                                                                     
261. See supra notes 19–25 and accompanying text. The argument from marginal cases is 
addressed more broadly in Cupp, Children and Chimps, supra note 26.
262. See supra Sections I.A–C. 
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allowing animal legal personhood based on cognitive abilities could 
unintentionally lead to gradual erosion of protections for these especially 
vulnerable humans.264 The sky would not immediately fall if courts 
started treating chimpanzees as persons. As noted above, that is part of 
the challenge in recognizing the danger. But over time, both the courts 
and society might be tempted to not only view the most intelligent 
animals more like we now view humans, but also to view the least 
intelligent humans more like we now view animals.265
Professor Laurence Tribe has expressed concern that the approach to 
legal personhood for intelligent animals—set forth in a much-discussed 
book by Steven Wise, the NhRP’s president—might be harmful for 
humans with cognitive impairments. The book, Rattling the Cage, was 
published in 2000.266 In 2001 Professor Tribe stated “enormous 
admiration for [Mr. Wise’s] overall enterprise and approach,” but 
cautioned that 
[o]nce we have said that infants and very old people with 
advanced Alzheimer’s and the comatose have no rights 
unless we choose to grant them, we must decide about 
people who are three-quarters of the way to such a condition. 
I needn’t spell it all out, but the possibilities are genocidal 
and horrific and reminiscent of slavery and of the 
holocaust.267
Mr. Wise later responded in part: “I argue that a realistic or practical 
autonomy is a sufficient, not a necessary, condition for legal rights. Other 
grounds for entitlement to basic rights may exist.”268 But Mr. Wise also 
noted that in his view entitlements to rights cannot be based only on being 
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human.269
This Article’s author did not find in the NhRP’s briefs an explanation 
why, despite Mr. Wise’s apparent view that being part of the human 
community is not alone sufficient for personhood, he and the NhRP think 
courts should recognize personhood in someone like a permanently 
comatose infant. If the argument is that the permanently comatose infant 
has rights based on dignity interests, but that dignity is not grounded in 
being a part of the human community, why would this proposed 
alternative basis for personhood only apply to humans and to particularly 
intelligent animals? Would all animals capable of suffering, regardless of 
their level of intelligence, be entitled to legal personhood based on 
dignity?
Further, if a rights-bearing but permanently comatose infant is not 
capable of suffering, would even animals that are not capable of suffering 
be entitled to dignity-based personhood under this position? In his 2002 
book, Drawing the Line, Mr. Wise seems to argue that, under equality 
principles, granting rights to a baby “born into a permanent vegetative 
state” or to a man with an IQ of ten supports granting rights to what he 
describes as “Category Two” animals in terms of autonomy values, in
addition to the animals who may be among the most intelligent, such as 
great apes.270 In Category Two he includes animals such as dogs, African 
elephants, and African grey parrots, which are thought to have relatively 
high intelligence.271 He also asserts that, with animals that are lower on 
the scale of the probability of practical autonomy, at a point the disparities 
in autonomy between the animals and a man with very low intelligence 
“become small enough to allow a judge to distinguish rationally between 
that creature and a severely retarded man. And at some point, the 
psychological and political barriers to equality for a nonhuman animal 
with a low autonomy value become insuperable.”272
But, again, what if we consider the baby born into a permanent 
vegetative state instead of an adult with a severe cognitive disability, who 
may, despite his disability, have some abilities? Would Mr. Wise’s 
equality argument, if accepted, necessitate personhood for many, many 
more animal species that may have autonomy equal to or less than that of 
an adult with a severe cognitive disability, but more autonomy than that 
of an infant born into a permanently vegetative state? In light of our 
recognition of the legal personhood of an infant born into a permanently 
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vegetative state, how many animals would not merit personhood if an 
equality argument between humans and animals based on individual 
autonomy were accepted? As with basing personhood on individual
autonomy, the implications of an alternative non-cognitive approach to 
personhood that rejects drawing any lines related to humanity may be 
exceptionally expansive and problematic.273
Also, good intentions do not prevent harmful consequences. 
Regardless of the NhRP’s views and desires regarding the rights of 
cognitively impaired humans, going down the path of connecting 
individual cognitive abilities to personhood would encourage us as a 
society to think increasingly about individual cognitive ability when we 
think about personhood.274 Over the course of many years, this changed 
paradigm could gradually erode our enthusiasm for some of the 
protections provided to humans who would not fare well in a mental 
capacities analysis. Considering the interests of humans with cognitive 
limitations in terms of legal rights is relatively recent in the United 
States;275 “[T]he vast majority of the world’s intellectually disabled still 
live in horrifying conditions.”276 Progressive notions of legal rights for 
humans with cognitive limitations should not be viewed as safely 
established for the indefinite future.277 Deciding chimpanzees are legal 
persons based on the cognitive abilities we have seen in them may open 
a door that swings in both directions, regarding rights for both humans as 
well as for animals, and later generations may well wish we had kept it
closed.278
B. Among Beings of Which We Are Aware, Appropriate Legal 
Personhood Is Anchored Only in the Human Community
As explained by the philosopher Carl Cohen, “Animals cannot be the 
bearers of rights because the concept of right is essentially human; it is 
rooted in the human moral world and has force and applicability only 
within that world.”279 Thus, grounding the rights of humans with severe 
cognitive impairments in their humanity is not only consistent with what 
courts and legislatures have done, it is appropriate.280
                                                                                                                     
273. See, e.g., Cupp, supra note 264, at 30.
274. Id. 
275. See supra Part II.
276. Koh & Gostin, supra note 200, at 3.
277. See id. at 3.
278. See id. at 12. Regarding a possible misconception that acknowledging personhood’s 
foundation in a societal framework of rights and responsibilities could somehow be a threat to 
humans without the capacity for responsibility, see infra notes 304–11 and accompanying text.
279. CARL COHEN & TOM REGAN, THE ANIMAL RIGHTS DEBATE 30 (2001).
280. See id.; see also supra Sections III.A–.C. 
39
Cupp: Cognitively Impaired Human, Intelligent Animals, and Legal Person
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2017
504 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69
Our society and government are based on the ideal of moral agents 
coming together to create a system of rules that entail both rights and 
duties.281 Being generally subject to legal duties and bearing rights are 
foundations of our legal system because they are foundations of our entire 
form of government.282 We stand together with the ideal of a social 
compact—which we could also call a responsible community—to uphold 
all of our rights, including of course, our inalienable rights.283 As stated 
in the Declaration of Independence, “[T]o secure these rights, 
Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just Powers from 
the Consent of the Governed.”284 One would be hard-pressed to convince 
most Americans that this is not important, as from childhood Americans 
learn this concept as a bedrock of our social structure. It is not surprising 
that the American Bar Association’s section addressing civil liberties is
called “The Section of Individual Rights and Responsibilities.”285
This does not require viewing every specific protection of a right as 
corresponding to a specific duty imposed on an individual. The 
connection between rights and duties for personhood is in some aspects 
broader and more foundational than that. It comes first in the foundations 
of our society, rather than solely in analysis of specific obligations and 
rights for persons governed by our laws. As the norm, we insist that 
persons in our community of humans and human proxies be subjected to 
responsibilities along with holding rights, regardless of whether a specific 
right or limitation requires or does not require a specific duty to go along 
with it.286
It misses the point to argue, as the NhRP seems to do in its Lavery I 
brief that sought leave to appeal from the State of New York Court of 
Appeals, that personhood is unrelated to duties because we can call 
freedom from slavery a bodily liberty immunity right that does not 
require capacity.287 First, as noted above, this is too narrow a 
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conceptualization of connections between rights and duties.288
Further, whether freedom from slavery requires capacity does not 
control the question of personhood, since cognitively impaired humans’ 
personhood is anchored in the responsible community of humans, even if 
humans with cognitive impairments cannot make responsible choices 
themselves.289 The NhRP’s argument does not avoid the problem that a 
chimpanzee, although an impressive being we need to treat with 
exceptional thoughtfulness, should not be considered a person within our 
intrinsically human legal system, whereas humans with cognitive 
impairments should be recognized as persons.290
Professor Wesley Hohfeld wrote about the form of rights and duties 
between persons in the early twentieth century,291 and the NhRP’s brief
that sought leave to appeal the intermediate appellate court’s Lavery I
decision invoked his analysis to argue for chimpanzee legal 
personhood.292 Perhaps the most basic problem with the NhRP’s 
argument is that we are dealing with a question that must precede 
Hohfeldian analysis of the forms of rights granted to persons.293 Professor 
Hohfeld’s description of rights assumed it was dealing with the rights of 
persons.294 Our issue revolves around determining who is a member of 
society eligible for those rights and protections; in other words, who is a 
person. This is a foundational question that is not answered by Hohfeldian 
analysis.295
It is sometimes asserted that since we give corporations personhood, 
justice requires that we should give personhood to intelligent animals.296
But this ignores that corporations are created by humans as a proxy for 
the rights and duties of their human stakeholders.297 They are simply a 
                                                                                                                     
(N.Y. Feb. 23, 2015) [hereinafter Memorandum of Law], http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/
wp-content/uploads/2015/02/6.-Motion-for-Leave-to-Appeal-and-Affirmation-in-Support.pdf.
288. See supra notes 285–86 and accompanying text.
289. See, e.g., Cupp, supra note 264, at 31.
290. Id.
291. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial 
Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917).
292. Memorandum of Law, supra note 287, at 19.
293. See Hohfeld, supra note 291, at 721.
294. Id. Professor Hohfeld stated, “[S]ince the purpose of the law is to regulate the conduct 
of human beings, all jural relations must, in order to be clear and direct in their meaning, be 
predicated of such human beings.” Id.
295. See Thomas G. Kelch, The Role of the Rational and the Emotive in a Theory of Animal 
Rights, 27 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 9 (1999) (“[S]ince Hohfeld’s theory is largely descriptive, 
it does not really tell us what grounds our duties and, thus, what ultimately grounds rights. While 
Hohfeld’s theory may help us to identify and explicate legal issues, it is not a method for 
determining social and legal philosophical issues.”).
296. See, e.g., Cupp, supra note 264, at 31.
297. Id.
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vehicle for addressing human interests and obligations.298
The concept of an “argument from marginal cases” has an unsettling 
tone, because most of us do not want to think of any humans as 
“marginal.” The pervasive societal view that all humans have distinctive 
and intrinsic human dignity regardless of their capabilities may have 
cultural, religious, or even instinctual foundations.299 All of these 
foundations would on their own present huge challenges for animal legal 
personhood arguments to overcome in the real world of law, but they are 
not the only reasons to reject the arguments.300 Humans with cognitive 
impairments are a part of the human community, even if their own agency 
is limited or nonexistent.301 Among the beings of which we are presently 
aware, humans are the only ones for whom the norm is capacity for moral 
agency sufficiently strong to fit within our society’s system of rights and 
responsibilities.302 It may be added that no other beings of which we are 
presently aware living today, for example, the most intelligent of all 
chimpanzees, ever meet that norm.303 Recognizing personhood in our 
fellow humans, regardless of whether they meet the norm, is a pairing of 
like “kind”304 where the “kind” category has special significance—the 
significance of the norm being the only creatures who can rationally 
participate as members of a society with a legal system such as ours.305
Morally autonomous humans have unique natural bonds with other 
humans who have cognitive impairments, and thus denying rights to them 
also harms the interests of society—we are all in community together.306
Infants are human infants, and persons with severe cognitive impairments 
are humans who are other humans’ parents, siblings, children, or 
spouses.307 We have all been children, and we relate to children in a
special way.308 Further, we all know that we could develop cognitive 
impairments ourselves at some point in our lives, and this reminds us that 
humanity is the most defining characteristic of persons with cognitive 
impairments. 
                                                                                                                     
298. See Lavery I, 998 N.Y.S.2d 248, 251 (App. Div. 2014); see also Cupp, Moving Beyond 
Animal Rights, supra note 29, at 52–63 (discussing corporations as artificial entities serving 
human interests).
299. See, e.g., Cupp, supra note 264, at 31.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Regarding animals and humans, Professor Cohen asserts that “[t]he critical distinction 
is one of kind.” COHEN & REGAN, supra note 279, at 37.
305. See, e.g., Cupp, supra note 264, at 31.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 31–32.
308. Id. at 32.
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Thus, recognizing that personhood is anchored in the human moral 
world does not imply that humans with cognitive impairments are not 
persons or have no rights.309 As explained by Professor Cohen, “[T]his 
criticism mistakenly treats the essentially moral feature of humanity as 
though it were a screening function for sorting humans, which it most 
certainly is not.”310 It would be a serious misperception to view the 
appellate courts’ decisions in Lavery I and Lavery II as actually 
threatening to humans with severe cognitive impairments in finding
connections between rights and duties.311
This misperception would reflect an overly narrow view of how rights 
and duties are connected.312 Regarding personhood, they are connected 
with human society in general, rather than on an individual-by-individual 
capacities analysis.313 Again, appropriate legal personhood is anchored in 
the human moral community, and we include humans with severe 
cognitive impairments in that community because they are first and 
foremost humans living in our society.314 Indeed, the history of legal 
rights for children and, as set forth above, the history of legal rights for 
cognitively impaired humans is a history of increasing emphasis on their 
humanity.315 The Lavery I court noted that “some humans are less able to 
bear legal duties or responsibilities than others. These differences do not 
alter our analysis, as it is undeniable that, collectively, human beings 
possess the unique ability to bear legal responsibility.”316
In May 2015, Professor Lawrence Tribe submitted an amicus curiae 
letter brief in support of NhRP’s motion that sought leave to appeal the 
Lavery I case to the Court of Appeals of the State of New York.317 Among 
the matters he addressed in the letter brief are two common theoretical 
                                                                                                                     
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id. Of course, individual capacities are relevant to some specific rights, for example, the 
right to vote. They are not relevant to humans’ personhood. See id. at 32 n.35.
314. Id. at 32. Further, the status quo views humans as persons based on their humanity, and 
infants and other cognitively impaired persons are unquestionably included. It is rejecting this 
status quo in favor of an approach that denies membership in the human community as the 
foundation for personhood that would create risk for cognitively impaired humans, not 
maintaining the status quo. See id. at 32 n.36. 
315. Id.; see, e.g., RICHARD FARSON, BIRTHRIGHTS 1 (1974) (asserting that denying rights to 
children denies “their right to full humanity”).
316. Lavery I, 998 N.Y.S.2d 248, 251 n.3 (App. Div. 2014). 
317. Letter Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 81. In September 2015, the Court of Appeals 
of the State of New York declined to grant leave to appeal for the Lavery I case and for the Presti
I case, but as of the writing of this Article, the Lavery II and Presti II cases are still in the appellate 
pipeline, and the NhRP may still seek an appeal of the Lavery II decision to the Court of Appeals 
of the State of New York. See supra Part I.
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conceptualizations of the function of human rights that academic 
philosophers and other theorists debate: the “interest theory” and the “will 
theory.”318 The interest theory maintains “that the function of a right is to 
further the right-holder’s interests.”319 The will theory “asserts that the 
function of a right is to give its holder control over another’s duty.”320
Philosophers and other scholars have squabbled over whether one of 
these theories provides a better accounting of the function of rights than 
the other “literally for ages.”321 Both theories are problematic if rigidly 
applied. For example, the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy notes that 
“the interest theory is also misaligned with any ordinary understanding 
of rights.”322 In any event, although one could argue that animals have 
interests and thus should have some form of “rights” under an expansive 
view of the interest theory that goes beyond its usual focus on humans 
and human proxies, such a conclusion is not in any way compelled under 
the theory.323 Professor Joseph Raz, a prominent philosopher who is an 
interest theory proponent, has noted that “[t]he definition of rights itself 
does not settle the issue of who is capable of having rights beyond 
requiring that rights-holders are creatures who have interests. What other 
features qualify a creature to be a potential right-holder is a question 
bound up with substantive moral issues.”324
Professor Tribe asserts that even under will theory, which may be 
viewed as a more restrictive perspective on the function of rights, it is 
unsustainable to equate legal personhood with rights-
holding because the class of potential rights-holders under 
that definition would exclude what our culture universally 
regards as legal persons. Needless to say, infant children and 
comatose adults are paradigmatic legal persons. Yet they 
certainly do not possess what will theorists would deem 
rights.325
But this line of argument undervalues courts’ consistent emphasis on 
humanity’s centrality to personhood. Courts have appropriately 
recognized that there is something distinctive in humanity.326 As 
                                                                                                                     
318. See Letter Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 81, at 8–10.
319. Rights, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. § 2.2.2 (Sept. 9, 2015), http://plato.stanford.edu/
entries/rights/#2.2.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. See J. Raz, On the Nature of Rights, 93 MIND 194, 204 (1984).
324. Id.
325. Letter Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 81, at 9.
326. See supra Sections III.A–B.
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discussed above, this perception of distinctiveness may have cultural, 
religious, or even instinctual foundations, but humans with severe 
cognitive impairments and infants should be considered first as humans 
rather than by their limitations because they are factually part of society’s 
community, even if they cannot themselves act as moral agents.327
Further, courts appropriately do not tend to declare allegiance to either of 
these competing academic philosophical theories in addressing rights. As 
addressed in Section I.D, courts are, to say the least, not rigidly beholden 
to conflicting academic philosophical theories.328
C. The Broad Range of Circumstances Related to Human Cognitive 
Impairments Further Undercuts Efforts to Make Autonomy 
Comparisons with Animals 
Humans experience cognitive impairments in a broad range of 
circumstances. For example, a typical infant has significant cognitive 
limitations, but they are temporary, and the infant will in most cases 
eventually become a fully accountable member of society with a great 
deal of autonomy.329 As addressed in an earlier article, because they will 
likely develop a high degree of autonomy and for other reasons, the 
argument from marginal cases seeking to make equality comparisons 
with typical infants who bear rights is unsustainable.330
Humans born with significant cognitive impairments that do not allow 
them any degree of autonomy from birth, and that do not allow any 
realistic hope that they will ever attain any degree of autonomy, are at the 
other end of the extreme.331 As analyzed above, courts and legislatures 
have considered these humans full legal persons, and their decision to do 
so is appropriate.332 Between these extremes, humans may experience 
cognitive impairments in a variety of circumstances that present 
additional challenges to the argument from marginal cases.333
Among non-infant humans with cognitive limitations, those who have 
never had any degree of autonomy and likely never will have any degree 
of autonomy are a small subset.334 More commonly, humans with 
cognitive impairments fall into other categories that include at least the 
following: 
                                                                                                                     
327. See supra Sections III.A–B.
328. See supra Section I.D.
329. Cupp, Children and Chimps, supra note 29, at 31.
330. Id. at 31–32.
331. See supra Part II.
332. See supra Part II.
333. See Cupp, Children and Chimps, supra note 29, at 49.
334. See Van R. Silka & Mark J. Hauser, Psychiatric Assessment of the Person with Mental 
Retardation, 27 PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS 162, 163 tbl.1 (1997).
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(1) Humans who previously had no cognitive impairments, and who 
may again in the future have no cognitive impairments. For example, a 
head injury might make a normally autonomous adult temporarily 
unconscious, but doctors may expect or reasonably hope for a full or 
substantial recovery in the future.
(2) Humans who previously had no cognitive impairments, but who 
sustain cognitive impairments that are expected to be permanent. For 
example, an adult who previously had a normal level of autonomy may 
experience an injury causing a coma that doctors expect to be permanent.
(3) Humans who have cognitive impairments that may or may not be 
permanent but that fall within a wide range of conditions that allow some 
meaningful level of autonomy. For example, many humans function with 
a high level of autonomy despite having an autism spectrum disorder,335
and humans with intellectual disabilities usually are capable of some 
degree of autonomy despite their disability. Less than two percent of 
individuals with intellectual disabilities have conditions that may be 
described as “profound,” whereas eighty-five percent of individuals with 
intellectual disabilities have conditions that may be described as only 
“mild.”336
Humans in category one add to the other difficulties with the argument 
from marginal cases because, unlike animals, their cognitive impairment 
is probably only a temporary departure from a life of typical human 
autonomy.
Humans in category two also differ from animals in that they have 
previously experienced normal human autonomy. As addressed in Part 
II, members of society who currently have normal human autonomy 
know that they could become like the humans in category two.337 Taking 
away rights and personhood that the law has already recognized is much 
different than declining to extend rights and personhood where they have 
never before existed.
Humans in category three illustrate the difficulties that would be 
inherent in determining how severe human cognitive impairments would 
have to be to employ the argument from marginal cases. How can we 
confidently compare the autonomy of a human with an autism spectrum 
disorder to the autonomy of a typical chimpanzee? Regarding humans 
with intellectual disabilities, most of whom do not have severe mental 
                                                                                                                     
335. Autism Spectrum Disorder, NAT’L INST. MENTAL HEALTH, http://www.nimh.
nih.gov/health/topics/autism-spectrum-disorders-asd/index.shtml (last visited Jan. 5, 2017)
(stating the term “spectrum” refers to the wide range of symptoms, skills, and levels of impairment 
or disability that children with ASD can have. Some children are mildly impaired by their 
symptoms, while others are severely disabled).
336. Silka & Hauser, supra note 334, at 163 tbl.1.
337. See supra notes 308–09 and accompanying text.
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limitations, how can we in most cases confidently compare their abilities 
with the abilities of chimpanzees?
Further complicating the argument from marginal cases regarding 
humans with cognitive impairments is the increasing scientific evidence 
that human brains may not be readily comparable to animal brains in an 
apples to apples manner.338 Rather than simply considering intelligence 
on a simple spectrum that may be used both for humans and for animals, 
there is evidence that animal brains and human brains function in 
different ways.339 A frequently cited 2008 article coauthored by Daniel 
Povinelli, who was the project director for the National Chimpanzee 
Observatory Working Group at the time the article was published, posited 
that “the profound biological continuity between human and nonhuman 
animals masks an equally profound discontinuity between the human and 
nonhuman minds.”340
This assertion has critics as well as supporters, but it highlights that 
there is much we still do not know about animals’ minds and that science 
has not yet brought us to a place where we can fully understand all aspects 
of how animals’ mental processes compare to human mental processes.
As another illustration, researchers recently discovered that human brains 
have an asymmetrical groove that is deeper on the right side of our brains 
than the left, whereas chimpanzees lack this asymmetry.341 “The groove’s 
function is unknown, but its location suggests it played a role in the 
evolution of our communication abilities.”342 A researcher not involved 
in the study said that “[o]ne day this will help us understand what makes 
us tick.”343 Humans with cognitive impairments may generally have some 
cognitive abilities that intelligent animals such as chimpanzees lack, and 
most humans lack other cognitive abilities that chimpanzees have 
evolved to survive in the wild.344 Thus, although one can observe that 
                                                                                                                     
338. See Derek C. Penn et al., Darwin’s Mistake: Explaining the Discontinuity Between 
Human and Nonhuman Minds, 31 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 109, 110 (2008).
339. See id. at 110, 112.
340. Id. at 110. Some details of this theory are discussed in Cupp, Children and Chimps,
supra note 29, at 40–41. For further elaboration on the theory, see JAMES V. PARKER, ANIMAL 
MINDS, ANIMAL SOULS, ANIMAL RIGHTS 66–69 (2010).
341. See Claire Wilson, Human Brains Have a Groovy Feature That Chimps’ Don’t, NEW 
SCIENTIST (Jan. 12, 2015), https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn26778-human-brains-have-a-
groovy-feature-that-chimps-dont/#.VLZ343umBIR.
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. Id. Indeed, typical chimpanzees seem to have some cognitive abilities that very few 
humans possess. In one study, when the numbers one through nine appeared on a screen in a 
random order and then disappeared, chimpanzees were “able to recall the exact sequence and 
location of each number.” Douglas Main, Chimps Have Better Short-Term Memory Than 
Humans, LIVE SCI. (Feb. 16, 2013, 5:30 PM), http://www.livescience.com/27199-chimps-
smarter-memory-humans.html. Very few humans would be able to perform this task. Id. “This 
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even intelligent animals do not have the cognitive ability to function with 
legal rights and legal responsibilities in human society, engaging in more 
general comparisons of human versus animal intelligence as points on a 
shared continuum is not workable.
Finally, accountable members of society tend to perceive humanity as 
the most strongly defining characteristic of all cognitively impaired 
humans, despite their cognitive impairments. As a matter of common 
sense, a human with a typical level of autonomy does not look at a 
cognitively impaired person and perceive a nonhuman.345 Humanity is
humans’ strongest self-identifying characteristic, and we perceive other 
characteristics, such as cognitive impairment, as part of a person’s 
humanity rather than as something that makes them a nonhuman.346
This circles back to the fundamental point that membership in the 
human community or being a proxy for humans is at the core of rights 
and personhood.347 The small percentage of humans who have never had 
any autonomy and who likely never will have any autonomy may present 
a scenario for the argument from marginal cases that is somewhat less 
unwieldy than other scenarios for comparison, but even with these 
humans, the argument is highly problematic and unworkable.348 As 
addressed above, even humans who have never had any autonomy and 
                                                                                                                     
incredible short-term (or ‘working’) memory helps chimpanzees survive in the wild, where they 
often must make rapid and complex decisions.” Id.
345. “A growing body of evidence [shows] that [a certain] region of the human brain is 
heavily involved in processing and learning a wide variety of social cues, such as hand gestures 
and faces.” Tudor Vieru, How the Brain Responds to Viewing Human Faces, SOFTPEDIA (Sept. 
30, 2011), http://news.softpedia.com/news/How-the-Brain-Responds-to-Viewing-Human-Faces-
224765.shtml. A study showed that humans fixated on other humans’ faces in a manner that was 
“faster and more accurate” than fixations on primate faces. Elizabeth A. Simpson et al., Visual 
Search Efficiency Is Greater for Human Faces Compared to Animal Faces, 61 EXPERIMENTAL 
PSYCHOL. 439, 453 (2014). Further, “[i]n humans, there appears to be a domain specific 
mechanism for visually processing animals, perhaps due to the importance of detecting prey or 
threats, or as a consequence of animal domestication.” Id. at 439 (citation omitted). The study’s 
authors concluded that “[t]ogether, these results suggest that search efficiency for conspecifics’ 
faces may be privileged. Faces are unquestionably one of the most important visual stimuli for 
humans and other vertebrates.” Id. at 453. Interestingly, although humans located human faces 
the fastest, they located other primates’ faces more quickly than they located other mammals’ 
faces. Id.
346. This sense of connectedness with other human beings is different from odious racial 
preferences between humans. Racial preferences are illogical, whereas a special sense of 
connectedness with members of the human community is both logical and laudable given the 
centrality of humanity to the responsible human community. See Cupp, Children and Chimps,
supra note 29, at 50. Simply put, race should not matter in society, but humanity should matter; 
among other possible distinctions from animals, humans are the only beings of which people are 
aware for whom ability to function responsibly in society is the norm. See id. at 13.
347. See supra Section III.B.
348. See supra Section III.B.
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likely never will have any autonomy are, emphatically, humans first and 
foremost.349 Their legal personhood and full humanity is anchored in the 
responsible human community despite their individual limitations; they 
are not “marginal” humans. 
IV. CONCLUSION: FINDING A MIDDLE GROUND FOR EVOLVING ANIMAL 
PROTECTION IN A CHANGING SOCIETY
Among the other problems with expanding legal personhood starting 
with the most intelligent animals is that there is no predictable end point 
for its expansion, and the lack of a standard for expansion would magnify 
the potential harm that this radical change could cause.350 Instead of 
dramatically restructuring our legal system with potentially disastrous 
consequences, our legal system should follow societal evolution that is 
emphasizing more thoughtful treatment of animals.351
A. How Far Might Animal Personhood and Rights Extend?
The NhRP has stated that a goal of using these lawsuits is to break 
through the legal wall between humans and animals.352 But we have no 
idea how far things might go if the wall comes down. One might suspect 
that many advocates would push for things to go quite far.
The reason law does not fit perfectly with any single philosophical 
theory or other academic theory is that judges must be intensely 
conscious of the practical, real world consequences of their decisions. 
One practical consequence courts should expect if they break through the 
legal wall between animals and humans is a broad and intense 
proliferation of expansive litigation without a meaningful standard for 
determining how many of the billions of animals in the world are 
intelligent enough to merit personhood. We should not fool ourselves into 
minimizing the implications of these lawsuits by thinking that they are, 
in the long run, only about the smartest animals. 
How many species get legal personhood based on intelligence is just 
the start. Once the wall separating humans and nonhumans comes down, 
that could serve as a stepping-stone for many who advocate a focus on 
the capacity to suffer as a basis for legal personhood. Animal legal rights 
activists do not all see eye to eye regarding whether they should focus on 
seeking legal standing for all animals who are capable of suffering or on 
                                                                                                                     
349. See supra Section III.B.
350. See infra notes 353–55 and accompanying text. 
351. See infra notes 360–63 and accompanying text.
352. Michael Mountain, Lawsuit Filed Today on Behalf of Chimpanzee Seeking Legal 
Personhood, NONHUMAN RTS. PROJECT (Dec. 2, 2013), http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org
/2013/12/02/lawsuit-filed-today-on-behalf-of-chimpanzee-seeking-legal-personhood/ (“Our goal 
is, very simply, to breach the legal wall that separates all humans from all nonhuman animals.”).
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legal personhood and rights for particularly smart animals like 
chimpanzees. However, these approaches may only be different 
beginning points with a similar possible end point. 
The intelligent-animal personhood approach starting with the smartest 
animals is more pragmatic in the short term because the immediate 
practical consequences of granting legal standing to all sentient animals 
could be immensely disruptive for society.353 We do not have much 
economic reliance on chimpanzees, relatively few of them live in 
captivity compared to many other animals, and they are more intelligent 
and similar to humans than other animals. Thus, perhaps a court could be 
tempted to believe that granting personhood to chimpanzees would be a 
limited and manageable change. If that were accepted as a starting 
position, there is no clear or even fuzzy view of the end position. It would 
at least progress to assertions that most animals utilized for human benefit 
have some level of autonomy interests sufficient to allow them to be legal 
persons who may have lawsuits filed on their behalf on that basis.
Professor Richard Epstein has recognized the unmanageable slipperiness 
of this slope, pointing out that 
[u]nless an animal has some sense of self, it cannot hunt, and 
it cannot either defend himself or flee when subject to attack.
Unless it has a desire to live, it will surely die. And unless it 
has some awareness of means and connections, it will fail in 
all it does.354
Once the personhood door opens to the more intelligent animals, it 
would also encourage efforts to extend personhood on the basis of 
sentience rather than autonomy. Sentience is exceptionally important in 
ascertaining humans’ responsibilities in our interactions with animals. 
When an animal is capable of suffering, humans should be exceptionally 
                                                                                                                     
353. See Cupp, Children and Chimps, supra note 29, at 21. The Stanley ruling asserted in a 
footnote that “[t]he floodgates argument is not a cogent reason for denying relief.” Nonhuman 
Rights Project, Inc. v. Stanley, 16 N.Y.S.3d 898, 917 n.2 (Sup. Ct. 2015). The judge cited Enright 
v. Eli Lilly & Co., 570 N.E.2d 198 (N.Y. 1991), which involved a proposed tort law expansion.
See Enright, 570 N.E.2d at 201. Although the court provided no pinpoint citation, apparently the 
Stanley court was referencing the dissent in Enright. Stanley, 16 N.Y.S.3d at 917 n.2 (quoting 
Enright, 570 N.E.2d at 207 (Hancock, J., dissenting) (using the language quoted in Stanley)).
Interestingly, the majority opinion in Enright found it appropriate to consider what it viewed as 
“staggering implications” of the proposed expansion, and the difficulty, if the expansion were 
accepted, “of confining liability by other than artificial and arbitrary boundaries.” Id. at 201 
(majority opinion). In the NhRP lawsuits, courts must consider that there is no basis for 
determining how far to extend legal personhood among the world’s billions of animals if 
personhood is grounded in a vague intelligence standard.
354. Richard A. Epstein, Animals as Objects, or Subjects, of Rights, in ANIMAL RIGHTS:
CURRENT DEBATES AND NEW DIRECTIONS 143, 154 (Cass R. Sunstein & Martha C. Nussbaum 
eds., 2004).
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thoughtful regarding how they treat the animal. However, the 
implications of much broader potential expansion of legal personhood 
based on either autonomy definitions or sentience are enormous, and 
society should carefully evaluate them. Any court that contemplates 
restructuring our legal system must also contemplate the practical 
consequences. Eventually extending legal personhood to all animals 
capable of suffering could open the courts to billions of potential 
plaintiffs.
B. Applauding an Evolving Focus on Human Responsibility
for Animal Welfare Rather than the Radical Approach of
Animal Legal Personhood
When addressing animal legal personhood, the proper question is not 
whether our laws should evolve or remain stagnant. Our legal system will
evolve regarding animals and indeed is already in a period of significant 
change.355 One major reason for this evolution is our shift from an 
agrarian society to an urban and suburban society.356 Until well into the 
twentieth century, most Americans lived in rural areas. Most American 
families owned or encountered livestock and farm animals whose utility 
was economic.357 Now the United States is an urban and suburban 
society, and relatively few people are directly involved in owning animals 
for economic utility.358 Rather, when most people in the United States 
now encounter living animals, they are most frequently companion 
animals kept for emotional utility.359 Most people view the animals in 
their lives in terms of affection rather than financial assets.360 As law 
gradually reflects changes in society, transformation in people’s routine 
interactions with animals has doubtless influenced the trend toward 
providing them more protections in many respects. 
A second major reason we are evolving in our legal treatment of 
animals is the advancement of scientific understanding about animals.361
We are continually learning more about animals’ minds and 
capabilities.362 As we have gained more understanding of animals, we 
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have generally evolved toward developing more compassion for them, 
and this increasing compassion has been to some extent, and will continue 
to be increasingly, reflected in our protection laws.363
This evolution is a good thing, and it is probably still closer to its 
initial significant acceleration in the twentieth century than it is to a point 
where it will slow down. In other words, it seems quite probable that we 
will continue in a period of notable change in our treatment of animals 
for some time. We will continue evolving; the only question is how we 
should evolve. 
Two unsatisfactory positions and a centrist position may be identified.
One unsatisfactory position would be clinging to the past, and denying 
that we need any changes regarding how our laws treat animals. A second 
unsatisfactory position on the other extreme would be to radically reshape 
our understanding of legal personhood, with potentially dangerous 
consequences. 
A centrist alternative to these extremes involves maintaining our legal 
focus on human responsibility for how we treat animals but applauding 
changes to provide additional protection where appropriate. As 
emphasized by the intermediate appellate court that unanimously 
dismissed the NhRP’s Lavery I appeal, “Our rejection of a rights 
paradigm for animals does not, however, leave them defenseless.”364
When laws or their enforcement do not go far enough to prevent animals 
from being mistreated, we should change our laws or improve their 
enforcement rather than assert that animals are legal persons. The 
legislatures’ role in legal evolution should be respected and embraced, 
and courts should refrain from adopting extreme legal theories that would 
not enhance justice and that would be contrary to the views of most 
citizens. 
Recognizing that personhood is a fit for humans and not a fit for 
animals in our legal system does not limit us to considering animals as 
“mere things” with the same status as inanimate objects.365 “Mere things”
such as inanimate objects do not have laws protecting them. This is not 
an argument that we have done enough for animals. Based on shifting 
societal attitudes toward animals, quite a bit of evolution is likely still 
ahead even from an animal welfare perspective. 
Felony animal cruelty statutes provide a hopeful example of the kind 
of evolution that we have experienced and likely will continue to 
experience without restructuring our legal system to divorce personhood 
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from humans and human proxies. Twenty-five years ago, few states made 
felony status available for serious animal cruelty.366 A misdemeanor was 
the most serious charge available in most states. However, by 2014 our 
laws in this area had dramatically evolved. In that year South Dakota 
became the last of all states to make serious animal cruelty eligible for 
felony status.367 We need to continue evolving our legal system like this 
to provide more protection to animals where appropriate, not because 
animals are legal persons, but because humans need to be responsible in 
their treatment of animals.
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